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Abstract 
In this thesis we aim to answer the question on to what extent The Border Consortium and 
DanChurchAid, in a post conflict context, can alleviate insecurities hindering a sustainable 
return of the Myanmar refugees.  
Fieldwork in Thailand and Myanmar, along with UNHCR frameworks and theoretical 
literature on refugees and post conflict societies, have been used to examine which 
insecurities the Myanmar refugees express, how the organisations can alleviate these 
insecurities, and where they meet limitations.  
It can be concluded that the organisations can alleviate insecurities relating to reconstruction, 
especially aspects of livelihood and areas of return, but they are rather limited when it comes 
to insecurities concerning reconciliation, as a lacking trust in the Government and fear of the 
military are dominating. 
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1.0 Project design 
1.1 Introduction 
For decades hundreds of thousands of refugees have been living in refugee camps on the Thai 
border. They fled from violent conflicts and civil war, which have been ongoing in 
Myanmar1 since the military coup in 1962. The military regime oppressed the people and 
managed to maintain absolute power despite international condemnations and sanctions. As a 
result of the political instability and suppression a steadily increasing flow of refugees arrived 
at the Thai border, where the first camps were built in 1984 (Lang 2002: 11). Today 
approximately 120.000 refugees live in the nine camps along the border (UNHCR 2014: 5). 
Even though the camps were intended to be temporary shelters, the camps have now been 
homes for the refugees during the last three decades. With strong support from international 
donors communities have been built with schools for the children, basic healthcare, small 
businesses and agricultural programmes (ibid).  
 
During the last years the situation in the camps has changed and is now of great uncertainty. 
First of all; in November 2010 Myanmar went from a military regime to a nominally civilian 
government. Myanmar was no longer considered a pariah state, and the international 
sanctions against the country were lifted (Lidauer 2012: 88). The changes also meant a new 
priority for funding, as many donors began moving grant money away from organisations on 
the border to those working inside Myanmar (Zwartz 2014). The current situation in the 
country can be characterised as a post conflict situation, meaning that the conflict has 
subsided to a greater or lesser degree but is still ongoing or recurring in parts of the country. 
The Myanmar Government has initiated negotiations of a nationwide ceasefire agreement 
with the different ethnic groups as a sign of trying to end the long civil war in the country 
(Nguyen 2015). 
Another important factor is the military coup in Thailand in May 2014, which has meant 
enforced law restrictions on life in the camps. The Thai Government has always imposed 
harsh restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement (Human Rights Watch 2012: 2). 
However, the rules concerning permission to leave the camp have been further restricted and 
the consequences more severe, as those who leave the camps without permission become 
                                                
1 In this thesis we have chosen to use the current acknowledged name of the country; Myanmar. We are aware of the fact 
that ongoing discussions disagree on whether to use the name Burma or Myanmar. Myanmar is a name enforced by the 
military regime, but on the other hand calling it Burma favours the ethnic majority Bamar. However, it would be to 
undermine the sovereignty of the state not to acknowledge the name Myanmar. 
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subject to arrest, detention, and deportation. Moreover the Thai authorities have, without 
reason or explanation, conducted headcounts in the camps, which makes the refugees fear 
that the Thai Government is going to close the camps and push them back across the border 
to Myanmar (The Border Consortium 2014: 5). 
 
For the first time in decades there are talks about repatriation and a possible closing of the 
refugee camps in Thailand. Various actors including the Thai and Myanmar Governments, 
United Nation’s Humanitarian Council for Refugees (UNHCR), the donor community, ethnic 
groups, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), and the refugees themselves are all 
considering the possibility of repatriation (UNHCR 2014: 1). There has been no public or 
official announcement to signal the beginning of refugee repatriation, and it is stressed by all 
involved actors that the time is not yet right for a return (ibid). Nevertheless, changes are 
happening on both sides of the border, which leave the refugees to a life in uncertainty not 
knowing what to expect from the future. Changes and the rumours about repatriation have 
created a widespread sense of anxiety and fear, and the majority of the refugees express, that 
they will not voluntarily return to Myanmar, as the situation is now (Zwartz 2014). It is 
inevitably that the camps will close, and the refugees will have to return to Myanmar, but no 
one knows, when or under which conditions it will happen.  
 
Even though Myanmar is taking steps towards a positive development, the country is still 
recovering from 60 years of internal conflicts. The return of refugees to a post conflict 
society poses a number of challenges as the country is in the middle of a transition from war 
to peace (UNHCR 1998). We are interested in examining these challenges of the refugees’ 
possibilities to reintegrate in Myanmar and the wider sustainability of the return process.  
 
The above-mentioned leaves the refugees with much insecurity about the future and their 
possible life in Myanmar. Organisations in the camps have also felt the changes and there is 
an increased focus on how they can help to ensure the most sustainable return (Zwartz 2014). 
The Border Consortium (TBC), which is the biggest organisation within the camps, and the 
Danish organisation DanChurchAid (DCA) have slowly started to look into possibilities of 
preparing a sustainable return.  
We will investigate how organisations like TBC and DCA can help alleviate some of the 
insecurities of returning to Myanmar. In the changing context, we will examine the 
sustainability of a possible return of the Myanmar refugees, when the country is in a fragile 
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post conflict situation recovering from decades of civil war. This leads us to the following 
research question: 
1.1.2 Research Question 
To what extent can The Border Consortium and DanChurchAid, in a post conflict context, 
alleviate insecurities, which may hinder a sustainable return of the Myanmar refugees in 
Thailand? 
 
1.2 Structure of the paper 
In the following section, we will outline the different chapters in the thesis, in order to give 
the reader the opportunity to get an overview of how we have structured the various parts. 
First part is an introduction to the history of Myanmar and the conflict, which has lead 
hundreds of thousands of refugees to seek shelter in Thailand. We describe the conditions in 
the refugee camps and the recent developments in both Thailand and Myanmar, which affect 
the future of the refugees. 
Second part is a clarification of our methodological reflections and our approach to 
answering our research question. We introduce our methods, choice of theoretical approach 
and the considerations we have made during our fieldwork.  
Third part will outline our theoretical framework of refugee return to a post conflict society. 
We introduce concepts of sustainability, voluntary return and reintegration in a post conflict 
context. Moreover we describe UNHCR’s framework of sustainable return and the notions of 
reconstruction and reconciliation. 
Fourth part is the analysis and is divided into three parts. In the first part we analyse the 
insecurities, which hinder the refugees from returning to Myanmar. In the second part we 
examine the projects initiated by TBC and DCA to prepare a sustainable return. In the last 
part we analyse the limitations of the organisations’ work and include structures in the post 
conflict context in Myanmar. 
In the fifth part we discuss which factors can support the organisations’ work and create 
better conditions for a sustainable return, and moreover which factors can challenge their 
current and future work in Myanmar. We discuss collaboration with local partners, the 
Myanmar Government’s responsibility, the peace process, and the 2015 election. 
In the sixth part we bring our results together in a final conclusion in order to answer our 
research question. 
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2.0 Understanding Myanmar’s history and the refugee camps 
This chapter is an introduction to the context surrounding the Myanmar refugees in Thailand. 
First we will give a short summary of Myanmar’s turbulent history and the conflicts, which 
forced the refugees from Myanmar to seek shelter in Thailand. Moreover we will describe the 
refugee camps and how life has been for the refugees during the last decades. Finally we will 
give an update on the current changes leading to discussions of the future of the refugees and 
the possible return to Myanmar.  
 
2.1 Myanmar’s history 
Understanding the historical context of Myanmar is a challenge, because of its turbulent 
history with roots dated back to the British colonial rule. Since the independence there have 
been violent fights between the military and ethnic groups over i.a. ethnic rights, possession 
of land and the right to self-determination for the ethnic groups (Steinberg 2010). In that 
connection it is crucial to notice that the fights have not been between the various ethnic 
groups but between the military and the different ethnic groups. It would not be possible to 
include all historical events, instead we have chosen to outline the ones, which are important 
in order to understand our research area. 
  
Until Myanmar was incorporated in the British Empire in 1866, the country was an 
independent country ruled by shifting ethnic minorities (Steinberg 2010: 16). There are 135 
recognised ethnic groups where Bamar is the majority (69 %), and is by origin situated in the 
central low-lying areas (Holm 2012: 21). The biggest remaining groups are Shan, Karen, 
Karenni, Mon, Chin, Rakhine and Kachin, all situated in the border areas2 (ibid). 
Until the British colonial rule there was a balance between the Bamar supremacy and the 
ethnic minorities’ right to self-determination. This diversion of power changed in 1922 when 
the British divided the country into two parts – Ministerial Burma (MB), which were the 
more developed low-lying areas inhabited by ethnic Bamar and Frontier Areas (FA), which 
were the less developed areas, where the ethnic minorities were living (Thomson 1995: 273). 
This division created a gap between the two areas, due to the fact that while the British 
implemented reforms and a parliament in MB, they more or less left FA to self-
determination. According to the British colonisers this division was necessary, because they 
                                                
2 See a map over Myanmar in appendix 1. 
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believed that people living in FA were of a weaker race and less developed and therefore 
should not interact with the more civilised Bamar (ibid). Instead the British believed that the 
border areas should undergo a slow development with help from Christian missionaries 
(Gravers 2007: 2). 
This ‘divide and rule’ policy became even clearer when the British in 1923 implemented a 
parliamentary rule in MB with representatives only from the ethnic Bamar group. They 
considered the ethnic groups living in the FA unable to adapt to democratic reforms and 
participate in democratic discussions (Thomson 1995: 273). According to the Australian 
Myanmar expert Hazel Lang, this was the beginning of the ethnic conflicts and 60 years of 
civil war (Lang 2002: 25). 
 
During World War II the British lost control over Myanmar, and after the British left the 
country in 1948, it was left to define its newly gained independence. Though this matter was 
understood very differently by the ethnic groups – the ethnic Bamar was interested in 
regaining its autonomy after being under British dominance, while the ethnic groups living in 
the FA feared that they would lose their right to self-determination (Walton 2008: 893). 
With the aim of creating a federal union, the revolutionary General Aung San gathered 
representatives from the ethnic groups in an attempt to establish a partial self-determination 
together with a joint democracy. In 1947 this resulted in the Panglong Agreement, but 
unfortunately General Aung San was killed, before the agreement was effectuated. Instead 
Myanmar got a turbulent start as an independent country. Attempts to create stability by 
establishing a democratically elected parliament were immediately challenged by the ethnic 
groups who were striving for the self-determination, they were promised in the Panglong 
Agreement. They were opposing a Myanmar with a central government; they wanted to rule 
their own areas (ibid). 
Because of the instability in the country the Myanmar Military Tatmadaw was founded, and 
the constant insurrection resulted in the government being totally depending on the military’s 
maintenance of its power (Thawnghmung 2003: 443). In this fragile context of continuing 
riots and the ethnic groups’ wish to withdraw from the union, the military made a coup d’état 
in 1962 led by general Ne Win (ibid). The military regime suspended the constitution and 
created an authoritarian government with an isolationist agenda instead, including state 
control of the economy through a nationalisation of private companies and control of the 
prices. This new strategy led to suppression of the population and a continuing instability of 
the entire country (BurmaLink 1). Moreover the Myanmar Government legally got to own all 
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land, and since then the military has often been accused of land grabbing, as private, military 
and government enterprises have been allowed to forcibly relocate entire towns. No 
compensation is provided and farmers, who protest seizures, face penalties (Wagley 2013). 
 
In 1988 the country was close to going bankrupt, and the people went into the streets and 
demonstrated against the repressive regime’s fatal political structures, the political oppression 
and economic hardships. This was met by the military with massive arrests and violent 
confrontations, which led to thousands of people being killed in the streets (Thawnghmung 
2003: 444). 
Even though the attempt to unseat the military government failed, the fight for democracy 
continued and in 1990 the daughter of General Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi, and her party, 
National League for Democracy (NLD), won 80 % of the seats in the parliament at a 
democratic election (Steinberg 2010: 91). The result was ignored though and declared invalid 
by the military regime, which refused to hand over power. Instead Aung Sang Suu Kyi was 
put in house arrest together with many other opposition leaders (ibid).  
The military regime continued its offensive against the ethnic groups, and as a result of 
landmines, violence and guerrilla attacks of local communities, thousands of people had to 
flee to neighbouring countries, among them Thailand (Lang 2002: 11). According to the 
Myanmar Government, the ethnic diversity has been the main cause of political instability in 
the country, while the ethnic groups on the contrary argue that the lack of ethnic and political 
rights is causing the instability (BurmaWatch). 
 
When the cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, it left big parts of the country in total 
disaster, and thousands of people suffered from the worst natural disaster the country had 
experienced for decades. Some argue that the cyclone was one the first steps toward 
democratisation because the breakdown of the country forced the military to open up for the 
international society to assist the rebuilding of the country (Ghai 2008: 1). 
 
In 2011 the military leader Than Shwe retired, and the country officially transferred into a 
civil government lead by Thein Sein who was prime minister under Than Shwe. Military 
leaders dominated the new civil government, but officially it was the first democratic 
government in Myanmar since 1962 (Bader 2012). There are various explanations to why the 
military took a quite sudden change of direction. One explanation is that the military had 
administered the economy so badly that the country was on the edge of bankrupt. Therefore 
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they had no other choice than handing over power to a civil government in order to get the 
international society to lift their sanctions against the country (ibid). Another explanation is 
the threat from China. During the recent decades China has become a strong and powerful 
country in Asia, and it can be argued that in order to secure Myanmar from a future 
domination from their northern neighbour, the military regime found it crucial to get support 
from the international society, especially the US. The international society required in return 
for support and a lift of their sanctions that the military regime handed over power to a civil 
government and started a reform process towards more democratic conditions (ibid). 
 
The Myanmar Government is now trying to end 60 years of protracted armed conflicts with 
the ethnic groups and have engaged in peace talks. Currently they are working on a 
nationwide ceasefire agreement, and 16 ethnic groups have agreed on the first draft (Nguyen 
2015). However, the process it moving forward very slowly, and it has been stymied in the 
recent weeks by renewed fighting between government groups and ethnic groups in northern 
Shan state (Lorch 2015). Moreover two serious internal conflicts still remain in the western 
state Rakhine and the northern state Kachin which influence the wider stability in the country 
(UNHCR 2013: 1). 
 
Even though it has been a slow start for the new government, the reform initiatives have 
speeded up, and media freedom has grown, free trade unions have been allowed, and most of 
the political prisoners have been released (Lidauer 2012: 88). This marks not only a change 
in Myanmar politics but also a shift in the conditions for the Myanmar civil society in 
general. Myanmar began a comprehensive reform process that is expected to continue in the 
coming years. The country has gone from being a closed military dictatorship towards 
democracy, market economy and opening up to the outside world (ibid). Aung San Suu Kyi 
was released from house arrest in 2010 after many years of international pressure. Her party 
NLD became a part of the parliament in 2012, with Aung San Suu Kyi as leader of the 
opposition. It is, however, important to notice that the military party, Union Solidarity and 
Development Party, still has absolute majority, and the constitution guarantees 25% of the 
seats in the parliament to the military. This makes them able to make all decisions alone, 
including changes in the constitution, and they have veto power over any substantive decision 
on state policy (Steinberg 2010: 162). 
2015 can become a remarkable year in Myanmar politics, as an election is scheduled for 
October or November. This will be one of the most critical steps in the democratic transition 
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process, and Thein Sein describes it as the first time since independence in which all the 
political stakeholders will contest freely and fairly (Song 2015).  
 
2.2 Refugee camps in Thailand 
The Myanmar people have been intimidated for half a century, and the country has frequently 
been criticised for human rights violations such as religious persecution, ethnic cleansing, 
displacement of indigenous communities, forced labour etc. As a result of these abuses many 
Myanmar people have been forced to flee their country and become refugees in neighbouring 
countries as Thailand, China, Bangladesh and India. A refugee is defined by UN in the 1951 
Refugee Convention as someone,  
Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country (UNHCR 1). 
Thailand, which shares a 2,401 km long border with Myanmar, has received a steadily 
increasing flow of refugees from Myanmar since the first semi-permanent refugee camp was 
set up in 1984 (Lang 2002: 11). In 2014 it was estimated that approximately 120,000 
Myanmar refugees live in the nine official refugee camps along the Thailand-Myanmar 
border (UNHCR 2014: 5). The nine camps in Thailand vary in size from the largest, Mae La, 
with around 43,000 inhabitants to Mae Surin, with around 2,800 people3. The majority of the 
refugees are of Karen ethnicity (79%) or Karenni (10%), and they originate from Southeast 
(SE) Myanmar just across the border from Thailand (BurmaLink 1). According to unofficial 
statistics further two to three million illegal Myanmar migrants are staying outside the camps, 
where they work in factories or in agriculture (Human Rights Watch 2012: 8).  
  
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) has never signed the 1951 UN Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, which is the main international treaty for the 
protection of refugees (Lang 2002: 18). In fact, Thailand has no refugee law or formalised 
asylum procedures. Therefore the asylum seekers in Thailand are technically illegal 
immigrants, and the terminology of ‘refugee’ does not exist. The officially Thai policy uses 
the terms ‘displaced persons fleeing fighting’ (rather than refugees) and ‘temporary shelters’ 
                                                
3 See map over the refugee camps in Appendix 2. 
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(rather than refugee camps) (ibid). Nevertheless, Thailand has obligations towards refugees 
based in customary international law, the most important the principle of non-refoulement 
which is the obligation not to send refugees back to any country where they are likely to face 
persecution (ibid). The RTG recognises the Myanmar refugees as de facto refugees and as a 
group with genuine claims to asylum in the camps. The general policy approach from 
Bangkok has been to accept and assist the displaced persons on a humanitarian basis (Lang 
2002: 3). The policy provides for ‘temporary shelter’, and Thailand will not push back 
asylum-seekers until the conditions allow a return (ibid).  
However, the lack of a legal framework leaves the asylum seekers’ stay in Thailand uncertain 
and their status unclear. Although Thailand appears to tolerate the refugees from Myanmar, 
its policy of closed encampment harshly restricts refugees’ freedom of movement and 
thereby their ability to leave the camps, earning income, or for the children to seek good 
quality education (Human Rights Watch 2012: 2). Inside the camps there are no official 
means of earning an income and limited educational and training opportunities.  
 
In addition, refugees are highly dependent on aid from international organisations, which 
provide them with basic needs as food, clothing, shelter, protection etc. This has forced the 
refugees to be nearly completely dependent on outside help, and their coping mechanisms 
have therefore been severely eroded (ibid). The prolonged stay in refugee camps has caused 
the refugees to be strongly rooted in their refugee status and the restrictions on their lives 
have adverse psychological and social effects decreasing their self-sufficiency and mental 
health (U.S Department of State). The lack of long-term sustainable prospects in the camps 
has unfortunately created a climate, where many refugees tend to think only short-term 
solutions.  
 
The governance in the camps is dynamic with many key players involved with the inner 
workings of the camps. There are several groups who work to ensure security and protection 
including the Refugee Committees, Camp Committees, numerous NGOs and several 
Community Based Organisations. UNHCR established a permanent presence on the border in 
1998 and has since then been working with protection activities in the camps (UNHCR 
2013). It is important to mention that hence Thailand has not signed the refugee convention 
UNHCR is not allowed to have an operational role in administering the camps. This is 
instead carried out through collaborations. 20 NGOs and UNHCR have collaborated to form 
the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons (CCSDP) in Thailand. The 
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committee unites resources to most effectively serve the refugee population by coordinating 
various sector services and collaborate with the RTG (UNHCR 2006: 9).  
Moreover the organisation TBC has a leading role in organising and providing food, shelter, 
and other forms of support to the refugees. The organisation is an alliance of NGOs working 
together with displaced and conflict affected people of Myanmar to address humanitarian 
needs and support community driven solutions in pursuit of peace and development (The 
Border Consortium). The consortium works very closely with the camp committees to 
identify camp issues and continues to support efforts initiated by the committees to address 
these concerns.  
 
2.2.1 Durable solutions for refugees 
UNHCR and international organisations working in the camps are facing restrictions in 
Thailand, which makes it difficult to provide protection for the refugees (Human Rights 
Watch 2007 in BurmaLink 1). According to a Human Rights Watch report, Thailand’s 
refugee policies are described as fragmented, unpredictable, inadequate and ad hoc (Human 
Rights Watch 2012: 1), and international principles on refugee protection have little 
significance to the Myanmar refugees. 
A fundamental aspect of refugee protection is the search for durable solutions to the problem 
of people being forced to flee from their homes. There are three types of durable solutions; 
voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum, or resettlement in a 
third country. All three solutions are regarded as durable because they promise to end 
refugees’ suffering, their need for international protection, and their dependence on 
humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2006, 2: 130). 
Voluntary repatriation means that, after reviewing all available information about conditions 
in their country of origin, refugees decide freely to return home. This can both be an 
organised or a spontaneous repatriation (UNHCR 2005: 5). 
Local integration happens when refugees are offered permanent asylum and integration into 
the host society by the host government and settle permanently in the country of asylum 
(ibid). 
Resettlement to a third country involves the voluntary transfer of refugees from one country 
in which they sought refuge to another country that has agreed to admit them. It happens as 
part of the international community’s effort to share responsibility for refugees, so that one 
country is not hosting or integrating a disproportionate number of refugees (ibid).   
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The choice of solution is linked to the reasons for flight, as this will provide key indicators of 
the prospect for a durable solution to succeed. Also, for the refugee population as a whole, it 
will often end in a combination of the three durable solutions as each refugee’s sex, race, 
time of flight, community of origin, and particular reasons for flight, will have implications 
for the suitability of each of the three durable solutions (UNHCR 2005: 4).  
Although UNHCR normally promotes these three durable solutions for refugees, none of 
these solutions were available in Thailand until 2004, twenty years after the first refugees had 
arrived from Myanmar. Thai authorities allowed refugees to register with UNHCR 
periodically during 2004 and 2005, and since then all registered refugees have been eligible 
for resettlement to third countries, resulting in over 90.000 refugees being resettled 
(BurmaLink 2). However, the resettlement programmes are slowly closing down. Moreover 
Thailand does not allow refugees to locally integrate, and they are not likely to change this 
policy. Nor has voluntary repatriation been a possibility for the refugees, as they still fear to 
return to Myanmar. This might be changing. 
 
In this thesis we have chosen to focus on voluntary repatriation, as it is often regarded as the 
most desirable durable solution for refugees as well as for the international community, as 
long as the return is genuinely voluntary and sustainable. The principle of voluntariness must 
be viewed in relation to both the conditions in the country of origin and the situation in the 
country of asylum. To understand the possibilities for a voluntary return to Myanmar, it is 
important to look at the current changes both in Thailand and in Myanmar. 
 
2.3 Recent developments affecting the refugees from Myanmar 
Myanmar is at the time going through a top-down reform process led by President Thein Sein 
with greater political freedom, release of political prisoners, and an opening of the economy 
towards the outside world (Lidauer 2012: 88). The political changes beginning in 2011 and 
the progress towards a national ceasefire agreement have resulted in widespread talks of 
refugee repatriation. Various actors including the Thai and Myanmar Governments, UNHCR, 
the donor community, ethnic groups, NGOs, and the refugees themselves, are all considering 
the possibility of repatriation (UNHCR 2013: 1). 
The return of the refugees has been on the agenda between top-level military officials in both 
Thailand and Myanmar. Meetings have been held between the Thai and Myanmar authorities 
on return of refugees but discussions are generally around principles, and no timeframe or 
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written agreements have been made. Both governments remain committed to international 
principles for a voluntary return in safety and dignity. The Myanmar Government states that 
the refugees are welcome to return, but they acknowledge that the country is not yet ready to 
receive refugees (The Border Consortium 2015: 11). 
Since the Thai military coup in May 2014, the Thai military has restricted refugees’ 
movements and conducted headcounts in the camps, but they have given very little detail of 
their repatriation plans or reasons for the head counts. There has been no change in the 
official Thai refugee policy. Nevertheless, the significant changes on the ground have 
intensified concerns about the refugees’ future and raised anxiety and feelings of insecurity 
(The Border Consortium 2015: 5). 
 
In this evolving context, unique opportunities have emerged, which may bring a durable 
peace, and with it highly improved human rights and socio-economic benefits (UNHCR 
2014: 1). Although the signing of ceasefire agreements and significant political changes in 
Myanmar lay the groundwork for future return, serious obstacles remain to a safe return and 
repatriation of refugees (Human Rights Watch 2012: 2). This includes i.a. landmines, lack of 
access for UNHCR and humanitarian service providers, and the absence of substantive 
political agreements that will ensure a sustainable peace (Human Rights Watch 2012: 17). As 
argued by Vivian Tan, regional press officer from UNHCR, Myanmar is not in a position to 
look after tens of thousands of returning refugees,  
While UNHCR and other aid agencies have heightened levels of preparedness in light 
of positive developments in Myanmar in the last two years, we have consistently said 
that a number of conditions in southeastern Myanmar, where the refugees come from, 
are not yet fully conducive to organised returns (Zwartz 2014). 
Even though there is a consensus that conditions are not yet right for refugees to return, there 
are significant concerns that the refugee camps will be closed before Myanmar is ready to 
receive the refugees. These talks about repatriation have caused anxiety among the camp 
communities, as most refugees do not feel safe returning to their homeland (ibid).  
 
Another factor influencing the refugees’ life in the camps is the funding cuts to the border 
area after Myanmar’s recent developments. The international community has been quick to 
embrace Myanmar’s new reforms. After years of diplomatic isolation Western countries 
began lifting economic sanctions, writing off billions of dollars of Myanmar’s foreign debt, 
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investing in development projects and increasing development aid (BurmaLink 3). Due to all 
the positive attention Myanmar has received, many donors expect the country to be free and 
peaceful in the nearby future. This has caused many donors to shift their focus from the 
border regions and refugee camps to projects inside Myanmar. With several aid organisations 
and Western countries cutting support to organisations based on the Thai-Myanmar border, 
all projects in this area have been affected (BurmaLink 4). For the refugees the funding cuts 
entail a reduction in their food supplies and the closing of schools. Many NGOs are strongly 
pleading the international community to continue their humanitarian assistance to the camps, 
until the future in Myanmar is more certain, and the conditions for a return of the refugees are 
more conducive.   
  
While all the conditions and safeguards for a return to SE Myanmar are not yet in place, the 
positive political and economic reforms and security developments have made it possible for 
organisations both inside and outside the camps to start working on preparedness activities 
for a possible return. UNHCR have finalised the paper ‘Framework for Voluntary 
Repatriation 2014’, a set of standards and principles to guide the possible return of Myanmar 
refugees. With input and approval from RTG, the framework calls for all stakeholders to 
ensure that repatriation will be voluntary (UNHCR 2014). Furthermore, they have developed 
a ‘Strategic Road Map 2015-2017’, which outlines different scenarios from spontaneous 
return, facilitated return, to an organised return under tripartite agreement between the 
Myanmar Government, the RTG and UNHCR. Although an operational plan is under 
development, it is not an indication that current conditions are right for advocating for 
voluntary return (The Border Consortium 2015: 11). 
 
2.4 Summing up  
This chapter is meant to give an overview over the situation for the Myanmar refugees in 
Thailand. It shows how Myanmar has struggled to meet the wishes of many ethnic groups, 
which ended in civil war and forced thousands of people to flee. For decades the refugees 
have lived in camps in Thailand, but now positive changes in Myanmar are opening up for a 
possibility of returning. The time is not right for a voluntary repatriation, yet it is inevitably 
that the refugees will have to leave the camps at some point. This has led to discussions on 
how to prepare the refugees for the return and how to secure a sustainable closing of the 
camps and reintegration in Myanmar. In the following chapter we will introduce our 
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methodological approach to examine a sustainable return of refugees in a post conflict 
context. 
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3.0 Methodological reflections 
In this chapter we will outline our methodological reflections and our approach to answer our 
research question. We will introduce our fieldwork and why this method is necessary for our 
understanding of the situation for the Myanmar refugees and the research area on return of 
refugees to post conflict societies. Moreover we will describe how we developed our research 
question and how a case study is the best way to answer it. Finally we will clarify the chosen 
sources and our theoretical approach.  
 
3.1 Fieldwork and research question 
We have chosen to conduct fieldwork in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of 
the situation for the Myanmar refugees and what a sustainable return requires. To understand 
the theoretical field of sustainable return of refugees, we gained an overall understanding of 
the research area before we conducted the fieldwork. We had the assumption that the 
repatriation process and thereby projects facilitating it already took place, and we were 
interested in examining these repatriation projects. In order to keep an open mind to the field, 
and to let the statements from the involved organisations be determining for our research 
question, we did not decide on a specific focus before we started the fieldwork. This meant 
that we only had an overall project frame and an aim to examine a sustainable return, and we 
were thereby open to possible areas of focus, which occurred during the fieldwork.  
 
Our fieldwork was conducted during four weeks in respectively Chiang Mai and Bangkok in 
Thailand, Yangon in Myanmar and the border areas between Thailand and Myanmar. We 
talked to different actors who are involved in the preparation for a sustainable return to 
Myanmar. We made three interviews with respectively three employees from DCA and one 
from TBC4. These two organisations are on different levels working with the possible return 
of the Myanmar refugees. Moreover we have also made an interview with a refugee, Myo T5. 
We conducted two of the interviews in Danish and two in English. The quotes we have used 
in the thesis from the Danish interviews, we have translated into English. It should be 
mentioned that we did other interviews, which have helped us gain a broader understanding 
                                                
4 Find the audio files in appendix.  
5 There is no audio file for this interview, as Myo T did not wish to be recorded. Instead find notes from the interview in 
appendix 3. 
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of the research field, without the informants allowing us to quote them or mention their 
names in our thesis.  
 
To get a deeper understanding of sustainable return we chose to make qualitative interviews 
because we were interested in gaining a more nuanced description of the organisations’ work 
to prepare the refugees for a return to Myanmar (Kvale 2005: 43). Through qualitative 
interviews we gained knowledge about what the informants experience as challenging in their 
work with the refugees and the possible repatriation (Brinkmann et. al. 2010).  
As mentioned we did not decide on a specific research question before we started the 
fieldwork in order to make the expressions by the informants be determining for our focus. 
Therefore we made semi structured interviews, in order to set the overall frame for the 
interviews and at the same time allow the informants to put emphasis on subjects they found 
especially important for the research area (Chambers 2008: 73). We found semi structured 
interviews the best method when we worked with an open mind approach, since it made us 
able to follow interesting aspects of the field, which occurred during the interviews. 
The interviews made us discover that the projects aiming at securing a sustainable return are 
still very much on a pilot stage. Therefore our findings were that the projects we wanted to 
explore did not quite exist yet, and we chose to take a step back.  
The informants all focussed on the insecurities and challenges for a return, and stressed that 
the time for a return is not yet right. The loose structure of the interviews made it possible for 
us to follow that track. Thus with a point of departure in the statements by our informants, we 
decided to focus on which challenges and insecurities hinder the return of the refugees, and 
what kind of projects the organisations facilitate in order to alleviate these obstacles. 
 
Our fieldwork is a case study, an inductive approach, because we use examples from the 
work of two organisations to draw some general conclusions about organisations working 
within the field of refugee return. We do not aim to generalise, but to draw some conclusions 
from the specific case, which can shed light on what sustainable return to a post conflict 
society requires. This approach is substantiated by social scientist Bent Flyvbjerg, who 
argues, formal generalisation is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas 
“the force of example” and transferability are underestimated (Flyvbjerg 2011: 305).  
We have chosen to use a case study as it makes our understanding of the research area and 
our research question more tangible. According to Flyvbjerg the case study is an important 
method in social science, as it produces a type of concrete, context-dependent knowledge 
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(Flyvbjerg 2011: 302). He argues that in the study of human affairs, only context-dependent 
knowledge appears to exist, and social science should therefore not follow natural science in 
developing epistemic theory. Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study 
of human affairs. Concrete case knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search 
for predictive theories and universals (Flyvbjerg 2011: 304). 
The case study is especially well suited for our thesis, as we want to understand the 
organisations’ possibilities of alleviating the refugees’ insecurities of returning to Myanmar, 
and we will therefore create knowledge which is dependent on the specific context (Flyvbjerg 
2005: 221). Furthermore we believe that a case study is the best method to answer our 
research question, as it is suited for why and how questions (Yin 1989: 13). We want to 
answer why refugees are reluctant to return to Myanmar and which insecurities hinder them 
from returning. Moreover we want to examine how and to what extent organisations can help 
alleviate these insecurities. 
 
3.2 Limitations 
In our thesis we focus only on voluntary return to Myanmar. We will address the issues and 
concerns of people returning to Myanmar. We will not look into cases of resettlement, people 
who choose not to return, or those who are unable to for any reason. 
Besides the hundreds of thousands of refugees the conflict in Myanmar has also resulted in 
more than 600.000 internally displaced people inside Myanmar. We will however not include 
their concerns or wishes for the future, as their possibilities for return are different from the 
refugees living within the camps in Thailand. Moreover we will not include the legal or 
illegal migrants, even though they make up a large part of the Myanmar population in 
Thailand and to some extent affect the Thai policies towards Myanmar people living in 
Thailand, hence their reasons for staying in Thailand are different from the refugees’ reasons.  
The refugees in Thailand mainly come from SE Myanmar, and the projects we analyse are 
situated in SE Myanmar. Therefore the analysis will be on the specific situation in these 
areas. However, the conditions in the south-eastern part of the country do not differentiate 
remarkably from the rest of the country, and we will also look at the overall situation and 
development in Myanmar, as it affects the refugees’ possibilities to return.  
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3.3 The organisations and informants 
When working within the field of refugees studies UNHCR and their work is crucial, as the 
agency is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and 
resolve refugee problems worldwide (UNHCR 2). However, we have not been able to get in 
contact with representatives from the local UNHCR office in Myanmar or Thailand. Instead 
we have chosen to focus on DCA and TBC, which are both organisations that work with 
refugees in Thailand and Myanmar. These organisations, as all other organisations working 
with refugees, are following guidelines defined by UNHCR and inspired by directions from 
UNHCR, when defining their strategic goals.  
We are fully aware that these are not the only organisations that work within this field, but 
due to our understanding of them as important and experienced actors within the field, they 
are valid informants to give us an understanding of the projects and challenges surrounding 
the future repatriation process. Furthermore it is important to mention that we do not 
investigate all of the programs facilitated or supported by DCA or TBC, as they both have a 
wide range of activities. We chose to focus mainly on the pilot projects preparing the return 
to Myanmar. In the following we will give a short description of the organisations and why 
we consider them as relevant informants.  
 
3.3.1 The Border Consortium   
In many cases refugee camps are administrated by UNHCR, since they have the 
responsibility to take care of refugees in states that have signed the refugee convention from 
1951. Thailand has not signed this convention, and therefore UNHCR are not allowed to 
administer the camps in Thailand. In their absence TBC is running the administration of the 
camps. The organisation was founded as a result of the first major influx of refugees after a 
request from the RTG to provide the refugees with basic humanitarian assistance (The Border 
Consortium). The organisation started as a group of voluntary agencies, but is today funded 
and supported by big donor organisation like Norwegian Church Aid, Christian Aid UK and 
Ireland and from Danish side by DCA. It is an alliance of 10 member NGOs from eight 
countries working together with displaced and conflict affected people of Myanmar to 
address humanitarian needs and support community driven solutions in pursuit of peace and 
development (The Border Consortium). Providing food, shelter and management support for 
the camps has been the primary function for TBC throughout the last 31 years; therefore we 
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see them as valuable sources, as they have a deep understanding of the situation for the 
refugees and the challenges which hinder them from returning to Myanmar.  
TBC is in close contact with the refugees on an everyday basis, and thus understands the 
refugees’ concerns about their current situation and possible scenarios for the future. TBC is 
furthermore an important source for us because they, besides from administering the camps, 
also facilitate projects both preparing the refugee for an uncertain future and also supports 
projects preparing a possible return. 
 
3.3.2 DanChurchAid  
DCA is a Danish NGO working to strengthen the world’s poorest people in their struggle for 
a life in dignity. Aid is given regardless of race, creed, political, or religious affiliation 
(DanChurchAid). For almost 25 years DCA has been helping the Myanmar people 
strengthening their life conditions during the civil war. They run programmes in Myanmar 
with a special emphasis on mine risk education and have now started developing projects 
aiming on preparing a sustainable return. As mentioned above DCA is a member of TBC and 
is contributing economically to the administration of the camps but is not directly involved in 
the work within the camps.  
It important to stress that DCA primarily works through local partners and is therefore not in 
direct contact with neither refugees nor local Myanmar people on an everyday basis. 
However, their work and knowledge is still useful, as they work closely with their local 
partners who are situated in areas in Myanmar where no international actors are allowed 
access. 
 
3.3.3 Interview persons 
Mikael Bjerrum is Programme Development Director for TBC, based in Bangkok. He has 
worked been working for the organisation for two years and has previously been in charge of 
the collaboration between TBC and DCA.    
Bjarne Ussing is Programme Manager at DCA, based in Chiang Mai. He has been working 
for the DCA for more than 11 years.  
Carsten Trier Høj is Regional Representative for DCA in Myanmar, based in Yangon. He 
has been working for DCA for almost 20 years. 
Mani Kumar is Programme Coordinator for DCA in Myanmar / Thailand, based in Yangon.   
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Myo T is a refugee who fled to Thailand 11 years ago. He has been living in the Mae La 
refugee camp for seven years, and the last four years he has been working in the border area 
for different NGOs.  
 
3.4 Sources 
In addition to the interviews conducted during our fieldwork we have used a broad range of 
literature including newspaper articles and reports containing opinions by relevant actors and 
sources on the future repatriation. We have mainly used articles from Myanmar newspapers, 
which include interviews with refugees who express their opinions on life in the camps and 
their possible future. We have found it necessary to include additional literature due to our 
limited time and especially our limited access to the refugee camps. Unless you have a 
special permission, it is not possible for any outsiders to enter the camps, which means that 
we have not been able to directly interview the refugees living within the camps in Thailand. 
It would of course be ideal to interview the refugees themselves about their reluctance to 
return. However, we do believe that interviewing people who work with and are in contact 
with the refugees on an everyday basis can gives a nuanced and true picture of the concerns 
and insecurities which hinder their return. Furthermore, our interview with Myo T, who is a 
former resident in Mae La Refugee camp and still visits the camp frequently, can contribute 
to expand our understanding of the refugees’ opinions.  
 
3.5 Theory 
The theoretical framework for our thesis draws on academic research about repatriation of 
refugees with a special emphasis on post conflict societies. The research can expand our 
knowledge and understanding of concepts of sustainable return, voluntary return and 
reintegration in a post conflict context. Furthermore we have chosen this focus because it is 
useful in order to frame the overall setting when understanding why Myanmar refugees 
hesitate to return to Myanmar and which conditions organisations like DCA and TBC are 
working under.  
We have chosen to use the UNHCR frameworks, as we will examine the organisations 
possibilities for contributing to a sustainable return to Myanmar. The chosen frameworks are 
developed to guide UNHCR’s repatriation and reintegration activities in post conflict 
situations. It is important to mention that the frameworks are not a tool that can be used for 
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the organisations to plan their activities directly, but instead it can guide them to develop 
strategic directions and improve the effectiveness of collaborated international assistance. 
Furthermore we do not use the frameworks to evaluate on TBC’s or DCA’s programmes but 
to understand to what extent the organisations can help prepare a sustainable return. 
 
In order to assess to what extent the organisations can prepare a sustainable return, we need 
to understand the ideal situation of sustainable return to a post conflict society. The 
frameworks from UNHCR help us develop a clear definition of sustainable return and what 
the process requires. They are applicable as they define the ideal situation for a sustainable 
return, and give us tangible methods to assess the organisations’ work. The frameworks are 
used in practice, refined from experience and lessons learned, and therefore give us an 
understanding of the actual requirements for a sustainable return.  
The frameworks can help us assess to what extent the organisations can prepare a sustainable 
return and where they face limitations. We use the frameworks to clarify what kind of 
assistance is required to secure a sustainable return and to examine which activities the 
organisations prepare and moreover how they fit into the larger picture of sustainable return 
to Myanmar. 
 
We are aware that UNHCR’s frameworks are not a definitive solutions or the only way of 
understanding the requirements for a sustainable return. However, we consider UNHCR as an 
experienced and valid institution when it comes to assisting refugees, mainly because they 
are the primary organisation working with refugees, but also because they are supported by 
all member states within the UN. Moreover they are working with refugee situations on an 
everyday basis, and their frameworks and guidelines build on a solid experience and 
knowledge. Furthermore their frameworks are useful, as it is most likely that UNHCR’s 
guidelines will, to some extent, be used to guide the return process for the Myanmar refugees.  
 
We are aware of the fact that UNHCR is often criticised for their implementation of their 
frameworks and guidelines, i.a. by Jeff Crisp for being flawed in their implementation and 
not reaching their intended objectives (Crisp 2001) and by B. S Chimni for lacking 
coordination with other UN agencies (Chimni 2002). However, the situation does not always 
allow UNHCR, or other organisations, to follow their guidelines closely meaning there can 
be far from ideal guidelines and theory about sustainable return to real life situations.  
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Another critique of UNHCR argues that in its efforts to contribute to the tasks of 
reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction, the organisation has raised expectations that it 
cannot hope to fulfil and assumed responsibilities that more rightly belong to other actors 
(UNHCR 2001: 16). Meaning that the organisation should limit itself to provide assistance to 
refugees and secure a successful return to the country of origin, and leave the social and 
economic reintegration to relevant actors (ibid). However, this critique of UNHCR does not 
influence the understanding of the requirement for a successful return to a post conflict 
society or the validity of their guidelines. We still find their frameworks and guidelines 
useful, as they outline which elements are important when working with refugees and return.  
 
To get a profound knowledge of sustainable return to post conflict societies, we have chosen 
to substantiate the UNHCR frameworks with theoretical inputs from researchers within the 
field of refugee studies. We have not sought a theoretical discussion, which questions 
UNHCR’s guidelines. Instead we want to strengthen our understanding of the requirement for 
a sustainable return to a post conflict society, beyond UNHCR’s more practical guidelines 
and frameworks, as we examine the organisations’ possibilities to alleviate insecurities in a 
post conflict context.  
We have used a wide range of scholars within the refugee field and chosen the ones that have 
focused on sustainability of the return process and moreover have knowledge or experience 
with UNHCR frameworks. Therefore we use i.a. the scholars mentioned below as several of 
them have worked as consultants for UNHCR and are thus familiar with possibilities and 
limitations of UNHCR’s work and repatriation of refugees.    
 
Barry N. Stein is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Stein’s 
research centres on issues of forced migration, refugees, and humanitarian assistance during 
conflict. Recently he has been a consultant to the United States Agency for International 
Development on ‘Post-Emergency Assistance’ and to UNHCR on ‘Returnee Aid and 
Development’. 
Jeff Crisp is Head of the Policy Development and Evaluation Service at UNHCR. He has 
first-hand experience of refugee situations and humanitarian operations in more than 60 
countries and has published and lectured extensively on refugee, humanitarian, and migration 
issues.  
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B. S. Chimni is a legal scholar with expertise in i.a. international refugee law. He has been a 
member of the Academic Advisory Committee of the UNHCR from 1996-2000 and has 
written several academic articles on refugee research.  
Richard Black is pro-director and professor at SOAS, University of London. His research 
area has included the relationship between migration and poverty and forced migration, and 
moreover he has been editor of the Journal of Refugee Studies from 1994-2009. 
Saskia Gent is a researcher at University of Sussex, Brighton. She specialises in the areas of 
politics and international relations and has made publications about sustainable return and 
case studies on return in the Balkans.  
 
We use the theory to understand and discuss the possibilities of a sustainable return. It is 
important to stress that sustainability is the ideal situation, which may not always be possible 
to achieve. A sustainable return is a return where the refugees are guaranteed their security 
related to different aspects. However, many conditions have to be provided and secured 
before reaching sustainability. Thus it will often be a question of degrees and to what extent 
the organisations can help facilitate a sustainable return. We cannot draw or establish 
absolute categories, as the term sustainability in this case is the ideal situation. 
The same dilemmas rise when we use categories to understand how organisations can 
alleviate the insecurities, which currently hinder a voluntary and sustainable return. The ideal 
situation is to completely eliminate insecurity. It is though unlikely that the situation in 
Myanmar will reach a point where the insecurities expressed by the refugees are completely 
eliminated. Thus we can only use these categories to shed light on to what extent the 
organisations can help alleviate these insecurities, and it will, like the concept of 
sustainability, be a question of degrees. Nevertheless, this method is still useful, as it creates a 
framework for our analysis and provides us with tools to understand what is at stake when 
preparing a sustainable return for refugees. 
 
Our thesis will be both an analysis of the current situation in Myanmar as it is now, and 
furthermore a broader analysis and discussion of how it should be, as our theoretical 
framework gives us guidelines to what a sustainable return ideally should include. Thereby 
we will move from the specific and current conditions to a more overall reflection on factors 
that need to be taken into account if a sustainable return is going to be achieved. It is 
important to focus on the reciprocal relation between the specific conditions and how it 
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ideally should be, as we want to assess to what extent the organisations can prepare for a 
sustainable return.  
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4.0 Theory 
In this chapter we will outline our theoretical framework. We draw on research of the return 
of refugees with a special focus on post conflict societies. First we will make an introduction 
to the research field, and outline how we define a post conflict society. Hereafter we will 
define the concept of sustainability, displacement and voluntary return and what these notions 
mean in a refugee context. In order to get a better understanding of how to create a 
sustainable return we will introduce four types of insecurities and the concepts of 
reconstruction and reconciliation.  
 
4.1 A historical introduction to the research field 
In recent decades the world has experienced more internal than international conflicts. An 
increase of internal conflicts has led to displacement of a large number of people both within 
and across states (Chimni 2002: 163). The return of refugees is thus an issue of growing 
concern for governments and international organisations working with refugees, particularly 
in post conflict contexts. A post conflict situation is defined as a situation where a conflict 
has subsided to a greater or lesser degree, but is still ongoing or recurring in parts of the 
country (Brinkenhoff 2007: 4). It does rarely mean that violence has completely ceased at a 
given moment in all parts of a country. Professor in International Relations, Michael Doyle, 
and professor in Political Science, Nicholas Sambanis, stress that no peace is perfect...never 
gets completely eliminated...We should thus consider peace to be a spectrum ranging from 
insecure to secure (Doyle et al 1999: 1).  
The return of refugees increasingly takes place to countries or areas where the causes of flight 
have not been entirely eliminated. In the past repatriation usually occurred only after a 
fundamental and durable change in the country of origin, whereas in many recent cases 
refugees have returned in the absence of a stable peace settlement or change of regime 
(UNHCR 1998). Return to a post conflict society involves a number of contexts with many 
challenges and scholars have questioned the notion of an unproblematic return. The concerns 
regard the conditions and voluntariness of return, the ability of individual returnees to 
reintegrate in their home countries, and the wider sustainability of the return process (Black 
and Gent 2006: 17). 
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Despite being one out of UNHCR’s three durable solutions, the return of refugees has not 
always been a high priority internationally. Between the end of World War II and the late 
1980s, return was rarely considered a possibility (Chimni 1999: 2 in Black and Gent 2006: 
16). At that time most refugees of concern to the West were from communist countries, and 
the preferred option was local integration in host countries in Europe. It resulted in a public 
policy focus on integration or assimilation rather than promoting return (Black and Gent 
2006: 16).   
During the last decades, international attention has been drawn more substantially to the 
return of refugees. According to Richard Black and Saskia Gent this is mainly a result of 
growing flows of refugees who come from a wider part of the world, and the numbers appear 
to have increased. The West has become increasingly impatient with what it sees as its 
refugee burden (Black and Gent 2006: 16).  
However, even though emphasis on return can be seen as a part of a restrictive attitude 
towards refugees, it is far from being the complete explanation. The end of the Cold War 
created a ‘peace dividend’, which opened up for new opportunities for return. Return of 
refugees became a central pillar of peace processes as they evolved during this time period 
(Black and Gent 2002: 16). Armed conflicts came to a formal end in several parts of the 
world, thus bringing a new degree of security and which enabled large numbers of displaced 
people to return voluntarily to their homes. Substantial return movements occurred, mainly 
within Africa but also in Afghanistan and former Yugoslavia. 
 
The circumstances, which confront returnees to post conflict societies, are often fraught with 
difficulties. It is though important to keep in mind that talking about post conflict societies 
can be somehow misleading because, as mentioned earlier, in post conflict societies, periods 
of intense or sporadic fights can occur. UNHCR acknowledges the challenges of the 
definition and scholar Joanna Macrae furthermore stresses that it is problematic that there is 
no clear distinction between when a conflict is in transition or when it can be defined as 
determined (Macrae 1999: 15 in Chimni 2002: 165).  
Return and reintegration in a country in the transition from war to peace poses particular 
challenges; the state and civil society are likely to be weak, the economy and infrastructure 
are run down or destroyed, and there is a high level of insecurity. Problems with return and 
reintegration in post conflict societies are not limited to the re-establishment of livelihoods, 
but another central barrier to sustainable reintegration is the breakdown of social relations 
between parties to the conflict (UNHCR 1998).  
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Despite the absence of suitable conditions for return, there will in many cases be a continuous 
and strong focus on repatriation of refugees, and UNHCR has been under pressure to promote 
and facilitate the return of refugees to countries where conditions are far from ideal (Chimni 
2002: 163). As stressed by Crisp,  
Despite a well-established legal principle that refugee repatriation should take place 
on a wholly voluntary basis and in conditions of safety and dignity, a substantial 
proportion of Africa’s most recent returnees have gone back to their homes in 
conditions which do not meet these standards (Crisp 2000: 172). 
Research and experience show that refugees frequently go back to countries, which are not 
fully at peace, and the conditions for sustainable return are not in place. As Barry Stein 
argues, Most repatriations occur during conflict, without a decisive political event such as 
elections or a peace agreement and without a major change in the regime or the conditions 
that originally caused flight (Stein 1997: 161). In many cases the refugees return to situations 
of conflict and instability because they feel pressured and think it is in their best interests to 
repatriate, even if conditions are not completely safe in the country of origin (UNHCR 1997). 
Duress has in many instances been intentionally exercised by host governments, military and 
other actors, with the intention to force refugees to go back to their homeland. The pressure 
from the host community can be rooted in the political context, the social and economic 
burden of hosting refugees, environmental degradation and the possibility of social conflict 
(Chimni 2002: 163). Reductions in the international assistance weaken the living conditions 
in the countries of asylum, which can also pressure the refugees to return.  
 
The sustainable return will be difficult to achieve in most countries of origin, as return will 
often be to a situation where security and the relations between state and civil society have 
been undermined. However, it is important to work towards the ideal of sustainable return 
because the return is increasingly seen to have implications not just for the refugees, but also 
for the country of origin and the wider process of development (Black and Gent 2006: 24). 
As stated by UNHCR, Successful reintegration is critical to any national reconciliation and 
reconstruction process (Macrae 1999: 11 in Black and Gent 2006: 25). Moreover UNHCR 
states in its ‘Dialogue on Voluntary Repatriation’ and ‘Sustainable Reintegration in Africa’ 
that, Experience shows that if the issue of sustainability or reintegration of refugee and 
displaced populations is not addressed properly, the countries concerned will almost 
inevitably slide back into conflict (UNHCR 2004 in Black and Gent 2006: 25). If the 
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conditions for return are not right, it puts extra pressure on the country of origin and could 
raise potential for instability, renewed conflicts and further displacement (Black and Gent 
2006: 25).  
 
4.2 Sustainable return of refugees 
Like the reasons for refugees fleeing, repatriation movements also take place in diverse 
political and socio-economic circumstances. They vary significantly with regard to a range of 
variables such as; the number of people involved, the speed of their return, the extent to 
which it takes place on a voluntary basis, the way in which the repatriation is organised, and 
the conditions which the returnees encounter on arrival in their country of origin (UNHCR 
1997). Despite their heterogeneous nature, it is possible to talk about what makes the return 
sustainable. Sustainable return has been described by UNHCR as a situation where – ideally 
– returnees’ physical and material security are assured, and when a constructive relationship 
between returnees, civil society and the state is consolidated (Chimni 2002: 168). This means 
addressing four kinds of insecurities; physical insecurity, social and psychological insecurity, 
legal insecurity and material insecurity. If the conditions do not ensure these securities, it 
might lead the refugees to seek asylum again (Chimni 2002: 168). In the following we will 
outline UNHCR’s definitions of the four types of insecurities refugees face when they return 
to their country of origin. 
 
Physical insecurity An immediate problem which confronts returnees is the physical 
insecurity. In post conflict societies, parties to an armed conflict have formally agreed on 
peace, but in reality, however, the transition from war to peace is often long and difficult. The 
process is characterised by tensions and sporadic violence and moreover an ever present 
threat of a return to war (UNHCR 1997). 
 
Social and psychological insecurity Irrespective of the level of violence, the situation the 
returnees face is frequently characterised by a high level of social tension and psychological 
insecurity. If they are pressured to return, they will almost inevitably feel insecure about their 
future. If they repatriate voluntarily, they may have developed unrealistic expectations about 
the situation they will find when they get back to their place of origin. Moreover, in countries 
where large numbers of landmines have been laid, refugees may not be able to return to the 
place, which they consider to be their home (UNHCR 1997). 
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Legal insecurity A less evident but equally important form of insecurity experienced by 
returnees arises from their legal status and access to judicial procedures. Three issues are of 
particular importance in this respect; citizenship, documentation, and property rights. 
Citizenship is an essential component of human security. The refugees may not have proof of 
their nationality or be recognised as citizens of the country to which they return. In these 
cases they will lack the protection of the state and will be at particular risk of persecution and 
marginalisation. A more widespread problem experienced by returnees is a lack of official 
documentation such as identity cards and birth certificates – a situation which may place 
them at risk of arbitrary arrest and which may prevent them from voting, finding a job, 
gaining access to credit and moving freely around their own country. Finally, there has in 
recent years been a growing recognition of the need for returnees to have a secure title to the 
property, which they left behind, and the land on which they depend on for their livelihood 
(UNHCR 1997). 
 
Material insecurity Refugees rarely possess many resources when they go back to their 
country of origin. Yet when they arrive in their place of origin, they must survive in an 
environment which has been laid waste by armed conflict, where the marketing and banking 
system have broken down, where shops, warehouses, bridges and other elements of the 
infrastructure have been destroyed, and where agricultural land have fallen into disuse. In 
such circumstances, the refugees returning are hard pressed to survive and may be obliged to 
live an unstable, hand-to-mouth existence, dependent on relief assistance (UNHCR 1997).  
 
Following the above, we understand sustainable return as a return where the four types of 
insecurities are eliminated. Sustainability in this context means that the refugees can return to 
the country of origin and their safety related to different aspects of life is guaranteed. The 
objective of sustainable return as defined will be difficult to achieve in many post conflict 
countries. Thus it would be naive to expect the international community to achieve this ideal 
of sustainable return. Nonetheless, it is important to establish broad standards or goals, which 
multilateral actors can work towards (UNHCR 1998). As mentioned in the Methodology 
chapter, it will always be a question of degrees of security, as it might be impossible to 
guarantee all aspects of security when the refugees return.  
 
To eliminate these insecurities there is a need for reconstruction and reconciliation, which 
can lead to reintegration. To achieve reconstruction, the state will require resources to meet 
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security and material needs of war-affected populations, for example to rebuild damaged 
infrastructure and removal of landmines. In the longer term, it also involves a commitment to 
expand education and social services. Moreover, it also requires the creation or strengthening 
of political institutions, administrative structures and police and judiciary systems (UNHCR 
1998). This mainly relates to the state’s capacity to perform its functions. 
However, the state’s ability to achieve this is essentially dependent on civil society and 
reconciliation. It is therefore crucial for states emerging from violent conflict to secure the 
commitment and participation of all levels of society to a process of reconciliation.  
Reconciliation - in its widest sense - requires that the parties to the conflict develop a 
common understanding of the causes and nature of the conflict, and develop shared 
notions of responsibility. At the very minimum, reconciliation involves ensuring the 
peaceful co-existence of parties to the conflict (UNHCR 1998).  
Reconciliation includes consensus building on notions of responsibility and justice, 
promotion of human rights and minority rights through legislation and education, to promote 
equity in the field of political, social and economic rights, and to strengthen civil society 
structures. This is vital to create a safe environment for people to invest in rebuilding social 
relations (UNHCR 1998).  
The relationship between reconciliation and reintegration is critical, as reconciliation has to 
precede reintegration. Reintegration is the process which enables formerly displaced people 
and other members of their community to enjoy a progressively greater degree of physical, 
social, legal and material security (Chimni 2002: 169). 
 
This holistic understanding points to the need of viewing repatriation and reintegration as an 
integral process in order to ensure sustainable return. UNHCR stresses the fact that, For 
repatriation to be a sustainable and thus truly durable solution to refugee problems it is 
essential that the need for reconstruction and national reconciliation be addressed in a 
comprehensive and effective manner (UNHCR 1994 in Chimni 2002: 168). This is not a task 
UNHCR possesses neither the human nor the material resources to undertake (Chimni 2002: 
168). No international agency can plan, initiate and complete the full range of activities 
needed to reintegrate returnees. UNHCR can begin the process of return and reintegration, 
however, it is not a development agency and no one can expect them to complete the job 
(Stein 1997: 9). Instead it calls for coordination and collaboration between all stakeholders 
involved to create and complete a reintegration programme.  
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An important component of sustainable reintegration is the willingness and capacity of the 
state to reassume responsibility for the rights and well being of all its citizens. A voluntary 
repatriation in safety and dignity requires the full commitment of the country of origin to help 
reintegrate its own people. Moreover the participation of returnees, receiving communities 
and local government is crucial to achieve sustainable reconstruction. As argued by UNHCR 
participation will help them to assess needs, and to ensure that local and national actors have 
the knowledge and skills to maintain reconstruction activities. Sustainability will only be 
achieved through enlisting the support and developing the capacity of local agencies and 
community organisations (UNHCR 1998).  
 
4.3 Displacement 
Refugees returning experience two relocations, one when they fled and one when they return 
to their country of origin. Each relocation is accompanied with a loss of the means of 
livelihood, such as land, jobs, homes and livestock, and each relocation marks the start of a 
tough restoration process (UNHCR 1997).  
As argued by researcher in Development Studies Laura Hammond, re-locating refugees 
assumes that the refugee cycle will end. But this may not be the case, as return may not be 
‘re-’ anything but the beginning of a new cycle (Hammond 1999 in Black and Koser 1999: 
227). Return is assumed to be a positive thing, and refugees are expected to establish or re-
establish themselves quickly. Yet in practice, the experience of return may be more, rather 
than less, problematic than the experience of exile (UNHCR 1997: 153).  
 
The many challenges refugees face do not only include livelihood or economic difficulties 
but also complex issues related to socio cultural, political, and developmental questions. 
Closing a refugee camp signalises that the refugees no longer have needs specifically related 
to their displacement. However, this does not mean that they may not continue to have a need 
for protection and assistance (The Brookings Institution 2007: 8). Displacement does not 
generally end abruptly. Rather, to end displacement is a process through which the need for 
specialised assistance and protection reduces over time – not ending the day the camps close. 
For example, claims to their property may not be adjudicated immediately, which leaves 
them without shelter or means of livelihood in places of return. Thus they may require 
humanitarian and financial aid until they are able to obtain shelter and employment in their 
new location (The Brookings Institution 2007: 9). Even if there is a durable peace agreement, 
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insecurity might continue to be a concern for refugees, especially if there are conflicts 
between returnees and the already resident population. Thus refugees are still people of 
concern even after the return.  
It is important to note that there are no clear rules for deciding whether displacement or the 
need for assistance or protection has ended. Rather, the situation must be assessed with all 
relevant stakeholders as a part of the process (The Brookings Institution 2007: 10). There is a 
need to pay attention to relations after return and to recognise that even if repatriation is the 
end of one cycle, it is also usually the beginning of a new cycle which can challenge and 
expose some returnees to vulnerability (Black and Koser 1999: 3). 
 
4.4 Voluntary return 
Refugees are the main decision-makers in voluntary repatriation, as they determine when and 
how they will return. Based on their situation in exile and the conditions in their country of 
origin, refugees apply their own criteria and decide when it is the right time to return. 
However, especially forces in the country of asylum influence the decision-making and can 
in worst case limit the voluntary character through pressure, harassment or direct violence. 
The danger does not always come from pressure from the host government but can also come 
from the inadequate international assistance, which forces refugees to choose between 
malnutrition and danger (Stein 1997: 2).   
It is often the case that the pull from the country of origin remains unchanged, but the push 
by the country of asylum has increased. This leads to premature repatriation, which 
unfortunately is a repeat of the refugee experience where neither the country of origin is 
ready for the return nor are the refugees. Premature returnees are pushed out by threats, 
attack, and expulsion rather than pulled by peace and safety at home (Stein 1997: 4). In these 
cases the concept of voluntary return does not mean a clear choice from the refugees, but 
simply the absence of force in removal, but where the refugees are given no choice at all 
(Black and Gent 2006: 19). While the ability of refugees to make the decision and organise 
repatriations is a hopeful sign, they are often forced into this position by hopelessness, 
danger, and lack of assistance (Stein and Cuny 1994: 181). 
 
The principle of voluntary repatriation is important, not only because it upholds the rights of 
refugees, but also because refugees who return freely to their homeland can play an important 
part in the recovery of countries which have experienced prolonged periods of turmoil and 
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violence (Crisp 2000: 172). Steven Holtzman, social scientist in the Post-Conflict Unit at the 
World Bank says, As long as significant portions of a society’s population are displaced, the 
conflict has not ended. There can be no hope of normalcy until the majority of those 
displaced are able to reintegrate themselves into their societies (Holtzman 1995: 15 in Crisp 
2000: 172). This shows a symbiotic relationship between the return and reintegration of 
displaced people and the peace building process. Unless uprooted populations can go back to 
their homes with a reasonable degree of security in their community, the transition from war 
to peace may in some situations be delayed or even reversed. 
The repatriation plays an important role in validating the post conflict political order. When 
the refugees voluntarily return, they express confidence in the future of their country (Crisp 
2000: 173). The success of return can be an indicator of post conflict issues, including 
progress toward development goals, and the extent to which civil-state relations will be 
repaired in the post conflict period (Petrin 2002: 5 in Black and Gent 2006: 18). In contrast, 
the continuing existence of a substantial displaced population represents a barrier to the 
legitimacy of post conflict states. 
 
4.5 Summing up 
In this chapter we have outlined concepts which are useful in order to get a thoroughly 
understanding of what is at stake when preparing a voluntary and sustainable return for 
refugees. In the following analysis we will apply these concepts to our empirical data in order 
to examine which insecurities hinder the return of the Myanmar refugees. Furthermore we 
will use the concepts to analyse how and to what extent organisations like TBC and DCA can 
help facilitate a sustainable and voluntary return. 
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5.0 Analysis 
In this chapter we will draw on our theoretical framework to examine the possible return of 
the Myanmar refugees in terms of sustainability. During the analysis we move from a very 
specific analysis of the current situation, to a broader analysis of how a sustainable return 
ideally should be.  
The first part will be an analysis of the insecurities, which currently hinder the refugees from 
returning to Myanmar. In the second part we will examine the projects initiated by TBC and 
DCA to help prepare a sustainable return. We will analyse the specific situation in SE 
Myanmar and how the projects aim to create better conditions for a future sustainable return. 
Here we move from a specific analysis of the situation as it is now to a more broad analysis 
of how it should be. In the third part we analyse the limitations of the organisations’ work, by 
focusing on how it ideally should be when working towards a sustainable return. As we wish 
to assess to what extent the organisations can prepare a sustainable return, it is important to 
focus on the reciprocal relation between the specific conditions and how the ideal situation 
should be. 
 
5.1 Analysis one  
In order to answer our research question, it is important to get an understanding of why the 
refugees hesitate to return to Myanmar. Thus we want to examine and understand the 
situation for the refugees and which factors currently hinder a sustainable repatriation. We 
will identify and analyse the four types of insecurities expressed in our empirical data and 
related articles. Moreover we will analyse the difficulties of the voluntary character of the 
possible repatriation of the Myanmar refugees.    
 
5.1.1 Insecurities 
As earlier defined a sustainable return can be understood as a situation where – ideally – 
returnees’ physical and material security are assured, and when a constructive relationship 
between returnees, civil society and the state is consolidated. UNHCR defines four types of 
insecurities to be addressed to secure a sustainable return. In the following part we will 
analyse each insecurity in the context of the Myanmar refugees. It is important to stress that 
repatriation can only be sustainable, if it is voluntary. Currently the Myanmar refugees do not 
express a willingness to return, and therefore we cannot talk about a voluntary repatriation 
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yet. According to Vivian Tan from UNHCR, conditions are not in place for an organised 
return to take place in a safe and sustainable way.  
When we asked them (the Myanmar refugees red.) about their main concerns over 
returning to Myanmar, they cited a continuing lack of trust in the current cessation of 
hostilities, a perceived lack of status or citizenship, as well as concerns over 
economic livelihoods, access to land, insufficient infrastructure in places of intended 
return, and security (Naing 2013).  
The refugees express several reasons for not returning, which we can categorise within the 
four types of insecurities; physical insecurity, social and psychological insecurity, legal 
insecurity and material insecurity.  
 
5.1.1.1 Physical insecurity 
The physical insecurity is for the refugees a very direct reason for being reluctant to return to 
Myanmar. As long as the Myanmar military is still present in the local township, the refugees 
do not dare to go back. The Burma Campaign UK has through interviews with Myanmar 
refugees identified fear of the military as one of the primary insecurities in terms of physical 
insecurity. Refugees, who have sneaked back to their old villages, report that the number of 
soldiers from the military has only increased since they left (Phan 2014).  
 
Mikael Bjerrum from TBC argues in terms of the fear of the military that the soldiers are still 
present in the areas the refugees came from and want to return to. They have experienced that 
the military attacked their villages, raped the women and burned down their houses. Trust is 
very limited. It is extremely hard for the refugees to trust that these types of abuses will not 
happen again (Bjerrum, TBC: 51.03-51.07).  
According to Saw U Maung, a refugee from the Tham Hin camp, he still fears to return to 
Myanmar because of the military. I cannot trust the situation in Burma. (...) There is no 
peace for the whole of Burma, just bits. If we returned the situation is not stable, and if the 
Burma Military want to take our land they can take it at any time (Eh Na 2013). 
His statement shows the importance of physical insecurity. He has chosen to stay in Thailand 
because of the continuing presence of the military and the lack of peace and security in 
Myanmar. The fear expressed by Saw U Maung does not stand alone. The refugee Naw Ka 
says, I don’t want to return to my village. I dare not go back. I am afraid of the Burma 
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Military. The Burma Military is still there in my village. If they were not there, maybe it 
might be different (Eh Na 2013).  
Sally Thompson, Executive Director of TBC explains that, People fled because they were 
subjugated by the military, which is still visible in the villages. They confiscate land and force 
people to work for nothing, or a very low wage. Before the military is gone, people don’t 
dare to return (DanChurchAid 2013). 
 
Clearly the presence of the military is a key issue for fearing the return to Myanmar. 
Moreover landmines are an important implication for the return of the refugees. Landmines 
have been used as effective tools to keep the conflicting party at a distance during the conflict 
between the ethnic groups and the Myanmar military. Today they pose a big threat to the 
people who lives in the areas where landmines have been dropped, and are an insecure factor 
in the refugees’ considerations about returning. As the refugee Come Zee argues about her 
thoughts on returning to Myanmar, The government should at least clear up all the landmines 
around the border, so we are safe to go home (Hui 2013). 
  
The timeframe for a change related to the physical insecurity in SE Myanmar is very 
uncertain. Even though it has been two years since the ceasefires between the Myanmar 
military and the ethnic armed groups in SE Myanmar were signed, no sign of a code of 
conduct or actual discussions on the roots of the conflicts have been seen (Phan 2014). 
Furthermore Sally Thompson argues that the implementation of the ceasefires is still missing. 
Even though several ethnic groups have reached a ceasefire agreement with the military, they 
still have not decided on important issues like demarcations of troops, code of conduct or 
monitoring mechanisms. According to her, the ceasefires are at the moment just agreements 
and the mechanisms still need to be implemented before change can happen (Naing 2013). 
According to Bjarne Ussing from DCA in Chiang Mai the time frame has only become even 
more uncertain the last year because of violations of the ceasefires in several different areas, 
which have made the refugees more cautious about returning (Ussing, DCA: 26.10).  
This statement is backed by Elizabeth Mimar, coordinator of Karenni Community College at 
Ban Mai Nai Soi Camp, who expresses the following on the current situation, Based on our 
experiences and the reality of the present situation, we have very low expectations [for the 
government] (Hui 2013). Nearly a year after the ceasefire, refugees still wait for a more 
permanent peace agreement. 
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Vivian Tan supports this argument by stating that, Overall, the attitude of most refugees is 
one of great caution. They want to be sure that they are returning to areas where there won’t 
be renewed fighting (Hindstrom 2014).  
While the ceasefire agreements have led to a reduction in fighting in SE Myanmar, there has 
been no respite from militarisation. TBC’s survey of ‘Protection and Security Concerns in 
South East Burma/Myanmar’ documented perceptions from villagers on similar or even 
increased troop strength from both the Myanmar military and the ethnic armed groups across 
70% of village tracts during the ceasefire period between 2012 and 2014 (The Border 
Consortium 2015: 8).  
In the Myanmar post conflict context, there is a situation where parties to the armed conflict 
have formally agreed on peace, but in reality there are still tensions and violence. The 
transition from war to peace has only just begun, and it may be long and difficult, and 
moreover there will be an ever present threat of a return to war. This physical insecurity 
makes the refugees reluctant to return to Myanmar. 
 
5.1.1.2 Social and psychological insecurity  
The situation the refugees will face in Myanmar is characterised by high levels of social 
tensions and psychological insecurity. First of all, there is a great uncertainty about what the 
refugees will return to, and which areas they will be able to resettle in. During the violent 
conflict many homes and properties have been destroyed along with property titles and 
records. Disputes can arise when the refugees return and seek to reclaim their houses, land, or 
property. According to Burma Campaign UK most refugees want to return to their old 
villages, and not to be forced into special economic zones as the Myanmar Government 
proposes (Phan 2014). However, no one knows yet which areas the refugees will be allowed 
to resettle in. According to Carsten Trier Høj from DCA in Yangon it depends on the window 
of opportunity, where the refugees will return to (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 3.45).  
This creates a stressing situation, which affects the refugees physiologically. For many of the 
refugees this will be their second relocation, where they have to start over again and start a 
tough restoration process. As argued by Carol Watson in a study of returnees in Chad,  
For the refugees who had received assistance in exile, the return could be more 
difficult than the experience of exile itself. In place of the semblance of stability and 
physical security established in camps, where the major problems of survival were 
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adequately met, a host of problems, uncertainties and dangers awaited the refugees 
on their return to their home country (Watson 1996: 105 in UNHCR 1997).  
 
Furthermore many of the refugees have been born in the camps and have no relationship to 
Myanmar. As mentioned by Bjerrum, The young refugees have no idea what return means, 
as they are born and raised in the camps and therefore have no motivation to return to 
Myanmar (Bjerrum, TBC: 06.37-06.43). They have no sense of belonging to Myanmar, and it 
will not be the case of returning home but the beginning of something new. Therefore return 
cannot be assumed to be only a positive thing, where the refugees are expected to establish or 
“re-establish” themselves quickly. 
 
The refugees have had some kind of security in the camps, and they do not know what to 
expect from life in Myanmar, which is difficult to cope with. As argued by Daw Khin Ohmar, 
coordinator for the organisation Burma Partnership, People in the camps are worried about 
moving. They don’t know when or where they will move to, and whether they will be safe 
during the relocation or at their new homes (Thein 2013).  
Myo T further argues that this insecurity about their future creates anxiety and a bad 
atmosphere in the camps. He says they feel like disabled people because they do not know 
what they will return to. The life they have in the camps is still better than returning to an 
unsure future in Myanmar (Myo T).  
 
The possible social tensions are also an insecurity for the refugees. According to Bjerrum, 
there might be a potential conflict when the refugees return to Myanmar. The refugees who 
live in the camps have had the benefits of food security, education and healthcare. The people 
in Myanmar have not been able to claim any of these things from the Myanmar Government 
(Bjerrum, TBC: 00:48). This can cause possible tensions between returning refugees and the 
local population, as the local population might fear that the returnees have better possibilities 
to get the few jobs available in the villages. This is also stressed by Høj who mentions that a 
safe return also means that people who already live in the area accept that the refugees come 
back. To avoid social tensions, discussions and preparations on how to facilitate and organise 
the return obviously also include discussions with the locals who lives in Myanmar (Høj & 
Kumar, DCA: 24.42). According to Høj, it is important not to favour the refugee, but also to 
be aware of the people in the villages and thereby create a situation where it is not only the 
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refugees who benefit from the return but also the people who already lives in the areas (Høj 
& Kumar, DCA: 28.29).   
 
For the Myanmar refugees the social and psychological insecurities are stressing, as they are 
in a situation where they have no idea what will happen in the future, but they know that the 
camps will close at some point. They experience funding cuts and thereby smaller food 
rations as well as the attention on reforms in Myanmar create fear of being forced back across 
the border. They do not know how the repatriation process will be, when it will be, where 
they will resettle, or what to expect from life in Myanmar. This inevitably makes them feel 
insecure about their future and reluctant to return to Myanmar, as long as they are not 
guaranteed better opportunities across the border. 
 
5.1.1.3 Legal insecurity 
Along with the three other components of insecurity legal insecurity is an important aspect 
when preparing for a sustainable return to Myanmar. Even though the absence of citizenship 
in Myanmar and a general lack of official documentation and identity cards are great 
problems for the refugees, our empirical data show that when it comes to legal insecurity, 
concerns over property rights are the most important aspect of legal insecurity. Furthermore, 
Burma Campaign UK stresses that one of the most important aspects of return for Myanmar 
refugees is a compensation for their destroyed homes (Phan 2014). Most of the refugees have 
lost their property or control over it. In rural areas especially, documentation of ownership 
has either never existed or has long since been lost (Fagen 2011: 11). Moreover landmines 
have been laid by both the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups, which make the land 
inaccessible. 
Ussing stresses the sensitivity of this subject because many different interests are infiltrated 
in it (Ussing, DCA: 36.50). According to him and also Bjerrum, the main problem is that it is 
the Myanmar Government who owns all land in Myanmar (Bjerrum, TBC: 25.02 & Ussing, 
DCA: 20.20). Even though some refugees have documents which prove that they own a piece 
of land, they will not get it back, since the land has often been given to someone else  
(Ussing, DCA: 36.50).  
The Myanmar Government has sold a lot of land to especially mining and other business 
companies. Despite ceasefires and the talk about peace agreements the Myanmar 
Government is often confiscating land and thereby also taking advantage of the natural 
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resources in the areas which used to belong to the ethnic groups (Phan 2014). This point is 
also stressed by Myo T who argues that even though the refugees bought a piece of land 20 
years ago, they might not have any legal document proving it and no possibility to claim it. 
He furthermore argues,  
For the refugees land is the biggest problem. The land they fled from, has now been 
taken by others. They cannot go back and claim their own land. The military has 
taken over the land or sold the land to companies. They have also sold mountains, 
where there might be gold, and the Burmese people cannot do anything about it (Myo 
T). 
Therefore the problem is, according to Ussing,  
Not only where the refugees want to return to, but where they are allowed to return 
to. Many of them have a document or testimonies proving the ownership of an area of 
land, but they will not get it back. There are many legal disputes, and these will 
continue (Ussing, DCA: 30.36-31.02). 
Not knowing where to return to, and if they might be forced to flee again, is a great insecurity 
for the refugees. They express concerns over the fact that they do not have any guarantees on 
which areas to return to. As mentioned earlier, many refugees want to return to their old 
villages, but the lack of documents to prove the ownership of land makes this critical. Not 
having any property right and a possibility to build a new home makes them reluctant to 
return to Myanmar. In the recent years, there has been a growing recognition from UNHCR 
on the importance and need for returnees to have secure title to property (UNHCR 1997). 
However this is a very complicated issue in Myanmar. 
 
5.1.1.4 Material insecurity  
When considering a return to Myanmar, material insecurity is also a key issue for the 
refugees. Most of the refugees have lived in the camps for decades where they have been 
highly dependent on foreign aid to provide them with basic needs as food, clothing, shelter, 
protection etc. This has unfortunately created a climate where many refugees tend to think 
only short-term solutions, and therefore the refugees rarely possess resources, which can help 
them rebuild a life in Myanmar. Moreover, they will arrive to a post conflict affected country, 
which have been significantly marked by the war.  
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The refugees are considering pros and cons by leaving the camps. One important factor is 
livelihood possibilities and ways to a sustain life in Myanmar. They do not know if the areas 
they return to will be suitable for farming, getting jobs or other ways of earning an income. 
Moreover, the war has affected the general development in the country, and there are limited 
possibilities for education, bad infrastructure, and a lack of health systems. For the refugees 
this is a great insecurity when they consider returning.  
Even though life is tough in the camps, it is still better than the alternative of returning too 
early. This is stressed by Ussing in the following quote, The problem is quite simple. What 
they are giving up by leaving the camp at the moment cannot be compensated inside 
Myanmar. The camps are so well run with security, healthcare, schools, and food rations 
(Ussing, DCA: 36.46-37.05). He furthermore argues that as conditions are right now - both in 
the camps and in Myanmar - it is far more attractive to stay in the camps (Ussing, DCA: 
37.10).  
 
According to Patricia Fagen, researcher at United States Institute of Peace, social services 
have assumed growing importance for the refugees. Returnees do not want to lose the access 
to education and healthcare that they had as refugees (Fagen 2011: 12). Bjerrum supports this 
by saying, In Myanmar there is no land, no jobs and no shelter. There are no possibilities to 
take care of the family. There are no existing social services as education or healthcare 
(Bjerrum, TBC: 35:40-36.01). He further explains that the individual family assesses what is 
best for their family and their future. Until now, they have had better opportunities in the 
camps. The children are guaranteed an education, they get food and shelter. However, he 
stresses that this is slowly changing. After the military coup the RTG has restricted camp 
movements and the funding cuts have consequences for the service level in the camps 
(Bjerrum, TBC: 58.03).  
The material security is a key factor, when the refugees consider returning to Myanmar. If the 
return is to be sustainable, the material insecurity needs to be eliminated, and the refugees 
need proper possibilities of sustaining and rebuilding a life in Myanmar.  
 
5.1.2 Uncertain future  
As outlined in this section the refugees express different reasons for not returning to 
Myanmar. Some of the main concerns include security concerns as the Myanmar military is 
still present in their villages, concerns over livelihood opportunities, access to land and a 
42 
general lack of social services as schools and healthcare systems. Moreover there is still fear 
and anxiety of not knowing what to expect if they return to Myanmar. This hinder a 
sustainable return and currently many refugees are in a waiting position. They are 
considering possible solutions, nevertheless, they are still not ready to go back to Myanmar.  
 
Statistic from TBC shows that not many refugees have returned yet. While it had been 
anticipated that the rate of returns would increase during 2014, it did not turn out to be the 
case. 4,689 refugees are known to have returned to Myanmar (The Border Consortium 2015: 
10). According to UNCHR the majority are single males who stated that they had returned to 
assess the security situation and start to re-establish their livelihood before the return of other 
family members. The dimensions of this return movement have been, so far, negligible 
(UNHCR 2013, 2). 
There are still too many uncertainties and insecurities, which create fear to return as the 
situation is now. According to Høj, the environment in Myanmar, with the coming election in 
the fall of 2015, is one of the reasons why the refugees hesitate to take the decision of 
returning. They are waiting to see the results of the election, and if it will bring positive 
initiatives and development.  
 
5.1.3 Voluntary repatriation   
As mentioned earlier, the voluntary decision is a key to make the return sustainable. As long 
as the refugees express concerns about insecurities and unwillingness to return to Myanmar, 
it is difficult to talk about a sustainable repatriation. The refugees are the main decision-
makers in voluntary repatriation, as it is up to them to decide when and how they will return. 
Based on their situation in the refugee camps in Thailand and the conditions in Myanmar they 
apply their own criteria to determine when it is the right time to return.  
However, especially forces in Thailand can influence the decision-making and can in worst 
case limit the voluntary character through pressure, harassment or direct violence. As argued 
by Bjerrum the military coup in Thailand has had a negative effect on life in the camps hence 
the headcounts as well as restriction on movements have created anxiety about a forced 
repatriation. This understanding is supported by Høj who argues that, The main push factor is 
what is happening in Thailand, the whole thing with the military regime, who are much more 
harsh on this question (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 12.41-12.56). He agrees, that life in the camps 
gets more difficult, which may push the refugees to consider returning. 
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The political pressure on the camps raises a concern that repatriation may not be completely 
voluntary, and that it may be encouraged before conditions in Myanmar are genuinely 
conducive to secure a dignified return. Many refugees fear that the Thai Government will 
close the camps and force them to go back to Myanmar. It is often the case that the push from 
the country of asylum increases while the pull factors from the country of origin remain 
somewhat unchanged. This can lead to a premature repatriation, which unfortunately will be 
a repeat of the refugee experience where neither Myanmar nor the refugees are ready for the 
return. If this happens, it will not be a clear and voluntary choice for the refugees to return.  
Even though Thailand has stated that they will not force refugees back and will conduct 
return according to international principles, community leaders and aid workers on the border 
argue that the recent restrictions on movement leave refugees with little choice but to 
consider returning to Myanmar, as the daily life in the camps becomes increasingly 
unsustainable (Zwartz 2014). 
 
With the current changes, TBC and DCA work to prepare the refugees for the future. A key 
focus point is to support the refugees in making their own decisions, and therefore TBC 
works with a community development approach where the refugees define their own needs. 
The approach of working with the refugees and listening to their wishes is also shared by 
DCA. As mentioned by Høj, We are never going to tell the refugees to go back (Høj & 
Kumar, DCA: 4.21-4.26). What the organisation focus on, is to discuss with the refugees 
when they want to return and hereafter try to find the best solutions. They stress the 
importance of a voluntary decision in order to secure a dignified return, If you talk about 
dignity in this, the self-determination is the key issue. It should be people’s own decision (Høj 
& Kumar, DCA: 12.21-12.29).  
 
The danger does not only come from pressure by the host government but also from the 
inadequate international assistance. Worst case, it can force refugees to choose between 
malnutrition and danger. This is stressed by TBC who urges the international society not to 
cut their funding to the refugee camps, as this may force the refugees to leave the camps 
before they are ready (DanChurchAid 2013).  
Bjerrum argues that, It would be tragic, if the funding cuts will force them to leave and return 
to an unsafe Myanmar. That would be embarrassing (Bjerrum, TBC: 1.06.51-1.07.02). He 
explains how it might get to a point where it simply comes down to, how much food the 
refugees will get. If the funding stops, the food rations will be smaller, and there is a limit to 
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how much food you can survive on (Bjerrum, TBC: 28.05-28.25). This can lead to 
spontaneous decisions where the refugees are afraid to return but do not get enough support 
in the camps. In that case the concept of voluntary return does not mean a clear choice from 
the refugees but simply the absence of force in removal (Bjerrum, TBC: 28.21).  
 
According to Høj, the funding cut is a difficult question (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 45.14). It is 
important to think about the privileges in the camps. If there continues to be good education, 
healthcare, all these privileges in the camps – but not on the other side, why should people 
then go back? As he explains, the refugee camps are not meant to be permanent structures, 
You always have to find a solution where it ends one day. And how does it end? That is the 
discussion (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 46.27-46.40). However, he argues that it is difficult to have 
an overview of the situation and find the balance between decreasing the funding without 
forcing the refugees to return before conditions are appropriate.   
 
The voluntary character of the decision to return is important because it ensures the free 
choice of the individual, which contributes, to a sustainable return. According to UNHCR, 
The requirement of voluntariness is, therefore, a pragmatic and sensible approach towards 
finding a truly lasting solution to refugee situations (UNHCR 2014: 9). Voluntariness is 
though only possible in an absence of any physical, psychological or material pressure. 
However, it is often the case for many refugees that a decision to return is dictated by a 
combination of pressures due to political factors, security problems and material needs 
(UNHCR 2014: 9). 
 
5.1.4 Summing up 
In this section we have outlined the different insecurities, which hold the refugees from 
returning to Myanmar, and stressed the importance of a voluntary decision in order to secure 
a sustainable return. The refugees will not voluntarily return before they are guaranteed a safe 
and decent life in Myanmar. The main concerns include access to land, possible ways to earn 
an income, withdrawal of the military and access to schools and healthcare systems.  
By reference to the identified insecurities, we will in the next section analyse how 
organisations as TBC and DCA can prepare the return by alleviating some of these 
insecurities and hereby create better conditions for a successful repatriation and sustainable 
reintegration.  
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5.2 Analysis two 
In the second part of the analysis we will examine how organisations can help alleviate the 
insecurities, which currently hinder the refugees from a sustainable return to Myanmar. It is 
stressed by UNHCR that the areas in SE Myanmar, where many of the refugees want to 
return to, currently face a number of protection-related risks and challenges. These include 
the lack of civil documentation, landmines, access to land and livelihoods opportunities, and, 
in some cases, restrictions of movement (UNHCR 2013, 2). These challenges all relate to the 
insecurities identified in the previous section.  
We will look at initiatives made by TBC and DCS, which focus on securing a sustainable 
return by trying to eliminate the insecurities expressed by the refugees. It is important to 
mention that these projects are only on a pilot stage, and therefore we cannot measure their 
impact. Instead we want to examine their possibilities of preparing a sustainable return. 
  
First we will explain the shift TBC and DCA have made from working mainly with 
humanitarian assistance within the camps, to now also working with development projects 
inside Myanmar. Hereafter, we will analyse initiatives, which aim at making the return more 
sustainable. Some projects focus on securing livelihoods, while other projects prepare the 
repatriation in Myanmar by exploring possible areas of return. We have chosen to focus on 
these two types of projects as UNHCR defines livelihood opportunities and resolving land 
and property issues as critical and key activities to ensure sustainable refugee return 
(UNHCR 2014: 8). These issues are also some of the most important factors stressed in our 
empirical data. Moreover a survey conducted by UNHCR in their ‘Return Monitoring 
Update’ about the needs of returnees to Myanmar also shows that areas of return and 
livelihood are the two most significant factors (UNHCR 2014, 2: 7).   
       
5.2.1 From humanitarian assistance to development projects 
A consequence of the last year’s developments in Myanmar has made the possibility of a 
voluntary return seem more likely, and therefore organisations as TBC and DCA have shifted 
their focus from mainly working with humanitarian aid to also working with development 
projects. As explained by Mani Kumar from DCA in Yangon, Over the years the focus of our 
work has been to work on the Thai border with the camps, mostly humanitarian support. Now 
with the changing scenarios, we are also looking at the situation and the potentials in the 
changing context (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 01.55-02.19). 
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Bjerrum explains how TBC is also slowly shifting their focus. However, he stresses that their 
development projects focus on the communities and villages where the refugees expect to 
return to and not the whole of Myanmar (Bjerrum, TBC: 00:48). This has been a balance for 
the organisation, since their main goal has always been humanitarian support to the refugee 
camps, and their aim has never been to do further development work in Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, as the situation is now, it has created a need for TBC to shift their focus from 
mainly humanitarian assistance towards preparedness and integration of development 
principles in humanitarian programs (The Border Consortium 2015: 13). As stated by Sally 
Thompson,  
This period of transition and cautious optimism regarding the prospect of return 
represents an opportunity to continue building on the work that we have done in 
order to ensure that refugees not only get the opportunity to return, but that they have 
an opportunity to contribute to Burma’s future (Ashayagachat 2013). 
 
When preparing for a refugee return it is important to remember that any large-scale returns 
will increase the needs on the Myanmar side of the border. When refugees return it is 
expected that needs will increase faster in Myanmar than they will decrease in Thailand, as 
return is considerably more expensive than care and maintenance in the camps. Return cannot 
simply be addressed by shifting resources from one side of the border to the other. Therefore 
TBC’s program in 2015 highlights preparedness while still emphasising that the humanitarian 
imperative for the refugees in Thailand remains. Preparedness in the context of TBC’s work 
refers to the over-all efforts to establish the groundwork for humane, dignified, and voluntary 
return and sustainable reintegration of displaced people in SE Myanmar (The Border 
Consortium 2015: 54). The program includes reinforcing the resilience of refugees and 
internally displaced communities, supporting the recovery of conflict affected communities 
as well as promoting a protective and enabling environment in areas of potential return (The 
Border Consortium 2015: 54). 
 
Even though closing a refugee camp signalises that the refugees no longer have needs 
specifically related to their displacement, they still continue to have a need for protection and 
assistance (The Brookings Institution 2007: 8). Ending displacement is a process through 
which the need for specialised assistance and protection reduces over time, and refugees are 
still people of concern even after the return. Thus preparedness work does not just include to 
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secure a safe return but also that the refugees are able to achieve self-reliance during 
reintegration and also contribute to a more prosperous, democratic and peaceful Myanmar 
(The Border Consortium 2015: 54). This is argued by Sally Thompson, 
Investing in conflict-affected people, investing in community development, and 
investing in preparation for return on both sides of the border is central to making 
sure that ‘return’ isn’t just a logistical exercise of sending people back, but is also a 
process of ensuring that reintegration is sustainable (Bangkok post 2013). 
  
5.2.2 Livelihood security 
Livelihood opportunities are a key activity to ensure sustainable refugee return (UNHCR 
2014: 8). This is also an important factor stressed in our empirical data. The refugees are 
concerned about how to make a living, if they return to Myanmar. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the areas in SE Myanmar are highly affected by the violent conflicts, and 
investing in creating the socio-economic conditions is essential. The majority of the refugees 
come from an agriculture-based economy, where the community is dependent on farming 
income. 
A major challenge for returning refugees will be to re-establish and secure their previous 
livelihood or find new opportunities for survival (UNHCR 2014: 5). It is though important to 
keep in mind that a large number of the refugees have been born in the camps and therefore 
do not have the qualifications to be farmers in Myanmar. Livelihood projects are therefore 
important in order to give the refugees the best opportunities to secure their future in 
Myanmar.   
 
To ensure livelihood upon return to Myanmar includes projects, which focus on ensuring job 
opportunities as well as building schools and reconstructing healthcare systems. A livelihood 
comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. It refers to the 
means of supporting one’s existence, especially financially (Morse et al 2009: 4) 
For many years, there have been projects in the camps, which focus on livelihoods. TBC 
driven projects address self-reliance by training and supporting the refugees through different 
projects such as a community agricultural program, training on entrepreneurship 
development, small business management training, micro insurance program etc. (The Border 
Consortium 2015: 34). Equipping refugees with the skills to access livelihood opportunities 
has been a central focus area, as many refugees have lived in the camps for decades and have 
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been dependent on external assistance. Giving them a possibility to attend these trainings 
helps the refugees to be less dependent on foreign aid, and it further more gives them 
responsibility for their own survival and a sense of agency. 
With the current changes and the possibility of return these projects have become even more 
relevant and useful. Livelihood projects are particularly important in a return context where 
the refugees will no longer be able to rely on humanitarian assistance to provide food, water, 
shelter, healthcare, education and other relief items. Livelihood projects aim at eliminating 
the material insecurities and making the refugees feel that they are able to take responsibility 
and support their family. 
 
To meet the insecurities on how to sustain livelihood and income upon return, TBC continues 
to work with projects, which focus on food security and farming skills. Upon return, many 
refugees will probably make a living as farmers, and therefore the enhanced agricultural 
skills will be an important asset. The projects train the refugees to produce a wide range of 
vegetables and food for their families. In addition to the skills they gain, and the food they 
produce for the family, they can also sell the vegetables in the camps and to external traders 
and hereby earn extra money. The refugees get technical and financial assistance to build 
their capacity to set up and run small businesses, which can be easily adapted to the Myanmar 
context (The Border Consortium 2015: 31). The farming projects can also compensate for 
some of the funding cuts, which cause smaller food rations. 
According to Bjerrum, the projects are a success and popular in the camps where many want 
to participate (Bjerrum, TBC: 23.01). He stresses that not all the refugees want to return to 
Myanmar to become farmers. Especially the young people might prefer to go to more urban 
areas to seek education or other job opportunities. However, the farming skills will be 
relevant for many refugees and can in many cases make the return more sustainable. 
 
Livelihood projects can help alleviate some of the material insecurities. Being dependent on 
foreign aid has for some refugees created a climate where they tend to think in short-term 
solutions. These projects can give them resources to survive and rebuild a life. The projects 
can also help alleviate some of the social and psychological insecurities about returning to 
Myanmar. How to sustain life is a big concern for the refugees, as they do not know if the 
areas they return to will be suitable for farming or other ways of earning an income. Giving 
them skills to take care of their family can hopefully make them less reluctant to return to 
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Myanmar. The material insecurity will be of less concern if the refugees are given proper 
possibilities to sustain and rebuild a life in Myanmar.  
 
In addition to eliminating material and social and psychological insecurities, improvement of 
the refugees’ livelihood capacities can also contribute to the reconstruction of Myanmar or 
maybe in smaller scales in the local communities. It can be argued that by integrating people 
with capacities to be farmers or start small businesses, they contribute to not only their own 
survival, but also to an economic flow in Myanmar. It is though important that the refugees 
gain these skills before they return to Myanmar because currently access to livelihood 
resources and training opportunities are very low in SE Myanmar.  
 
However, the success and usefulness of the livelihood projects highly depend on the areas the 
refugees will return to. Ussing stresses that refugees do not only need land where they can 
settle down and be allowed to stay, but the land furthermore needs to be suitable for farming 
and free of landmines (Ussing, DCA: 30.35). Furthermore a refugee states in a survey by 
TBC, If there's real peace, of course we will return... it's just that there's no land left to 
pursue our livelihoods (The Border Consortium 2014, 2: 12). Bjerrum argues that national 
politics and the willingness of the Myanmar Government are totally determining for which 
areas refugees will return to. He furthermore argues that there is a big potential for a 
sustainable agricultural sector, but as long as the Myanmar Government is unwilling to give 
up the land, there will be no significant development (Bjerrum, TBC: 24.30).  
 
5.2.3 Areas of return 
Another crucial insecurity is the concern about which areas to return to. This includes legal 
insecurity related to gaining documents and guarantees of property rights as well as material 
insecurity related to the conditions in the areas they return to. According to Chimni housing 
and property rights is one of the most important components of post conflict reconciliation. 
Indeed, property problems are at the heart of the return process (Chimni 2002: 168). Thus he 
stresses the importance of addressing this matter effectively (Ibid: 176). In the following we 
will outline which projects TBC and DCA are establishing in order to alleviate the insecurity 
about possible areas of return. 
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Before moving to the projects that the organisations are establishing, it is important to 
understand where the refugees come from, and what kind of repatriation scenarios there is at 
stake. Most of the refugees who live in the refugee camps in Thailand come from the states 
and regions in SE Myanmar. These areas have been fought over for decades and are now 
under various forms of administration, ranging from central government-control, partial 
administration or administration by armed ethnic groups (UNHCR 2014: 3). Most areas are 
rural areas while some are more urbanised. There will most likely be different scenarios for 
the return to Myanmar. Some refugees will return to their places of origin, some to an 
entirely new area where they have relatives or friends, urban areas where economic 
opportunities and services are more accessible, or places to be further developed (UNHCR 
2014: 4) According to UNHCR the majority of the refugees who had access to land prior to 
their flight express a desire of returning to these places (UNHCR 2014: 3).  
 
5.2.3.1 Mapping of potential areas 
TBC is working to map the preferred areas of return, in order to assess and understand the 
requirements for a sustainable reintegration. The aim is to build a profile of areas where 
interventions can be planned if the scale of returns increases. This makes them able to define 
the challenges of reintegration and to identify the types of humanitarian and development 
assistance that should be prioritised (UNHCR 2014: 3). DCA is through their local partner 
organisations also trying to identify the areas where the refugees feel safe returning to, and 
establishing a dialogue with the refugees where they discuss possible areas for a sustainable 
return. DCA though express that it is very uncertain whether the refugees can return to areas 
they want to, as it depends on the window of opportunities (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 3.45).  
 
Mapping the areas the refugees express a wish to return to and exploring what kind of 
initiatives that has to be established before a sustainable return can take place, is a very 
difficult process. One of the biggest obstacles is the lack of access to the areas. Bjerrum 
explains that it is crucial for organisations to have local partners to cooperate with. Therefore 
both TBC and DCA support local organisations inside Myanmar, who can implement the 
projects. It is too difficult for international organisations to get access to the areas, either 
because of the Myanmar Government or the ethnic armed groups in control (Bjerrum, TBC: 
48.35). 
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Another big obstacle is that all land is owned by the Myanmar Government. Ussing explains, 
that it is difficult to get clearance of land and prepare repatriation, as the Myanmar 
Government needs to approve the projects and hand over the land to returnees (Ussing, DCA: 
34.42). As argued by a refugee interviewed by TBC, Returning to work for a company on 
land that used to be my own is a demeaning prospect (The Border Consortium 2014, 2: 12).  
Kumar furthermore stresses that there is not much talk with the Myanmar Government about 
the land issue, Even though some partners talk with the township leaders, officially it is very 
difficult to get permission to do anything (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 19.27-19.39).  
By reference to the above mentioned, it can be argued that the organisations meet several 
obstacles when they try to alleviate the legal insecurity concerning access to land and the 
refugees’ right to settle down and establish a life in Myanmar. The process of securing land 
involves the Myanmar Government, as the organisations cannot give the refugees 
documentation on ownership on a piece of land without permission and consent from the 
Myanmar Government. Therefore this part of the reintegration process calls for 
reconciliation, which we will return to later.  
 
5.2.3.2 Reconstruction initiatives 
As mentioned in the above, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the organisations to 
completely eliminate the legal insecurity when it comes to access to land. Instead, what the 
organisations stress they can do, is to alleviate the material insecurity in possible areas and 
prepare the refugees for a return. 
 
In 2014 TBC established preparedness planning initiatives in the camps where they support 
Camp Committees and Refugee Committees in meetings with UNHCR and international 
NGOs to discuss the planning and possibilities for a sustainable return (The Border 
Consortium 2014: 18). One activity related to preparedness for return is ‘Go and See’ visits, 
where refugees, stakeholders from organisations, or local partners visit areas in Myanmar in 
order to identify possible locations for a return. The aim is to explore and understand what 
needs to be done before it is safe and sustainable for the refugees to return to these areas.  
There can be different scenarios when the refugees return. As explained by Kumar, the 
refugees might return to an already existing village or they might settle in an uninhabited area 
(Høj & Kumar, DCA: 27.04). Therefore there is a need for different approaches. In 
uninhabited areas the organisations analyse the situation with the help from local partners and 
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‘Go and See’ visits. In areas where communities already exist, it is important for the 
organisations to include the local Myanmar people in the process.  
As explained by Bjerrum, TBC uses a community driven approach, where they through their 
local partners facilitate public forums and public meetings in the local communities in order 
to identify what kind of needs the local communities have (Bjerrum, TBC: 55.24).  
 
In UNHCR’s ‘Return Monitoring Update’ from 2014, they identified 66 local villages 
classified as return villages meaning a village refugees have already returned to and intend to 
remain in permanently. These villages can according to UNHCR expect to receive further 
returnees. Therefore there is a need to ensure that returnees and the communities, which 
receive them, get the support needed to ensure a sustainable reintegration (UNHCR 2014, 2: 
12). In these villages the local communities have been asked to prioritise their needs, in order 
for organisations to be able to plan and implement the most relevant activities.  
 
 
 
The table shows that the scope of activities will be significant, ranging from securing 
essential healthcare facilities and services, education support, securing access to water, and 
livelihood initiatives.  
This further underlines the need to alleviate the material insecurities, which currently hold the 
refugees from returning. Myanmar has been laid waste by many years of civil war, and areas 
in SE Myanmar highly need investments in infrastructure, and moreover the health and 
education sector needs to be reconstructed and expanded. The healthcare system in SE 
Myanmar lacks skilled personnel, facilities, basic equipment and supplies. The education 
sector is also substantially underserved and not of adequate standards, lacking teachers and 
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an inadequate number of primary schools. Access to safe drinking water, particularly in rural 
areas, is uneven and in many locations insufficient. Standards of sanitation are very low, with 
open defecation common and household latrines less than international standards (UNHCR 
2014: 4). 
 
The refugees are, with good reason, concerned about the conditions of the areas they will 
resettle in. Therefore both TBC and DCA work to prepare the areas and plan programs to 
make a sustainable reintegration possible. These projects mainly focus on reconstruction 
activities as this is an important factor to secure reintegration. To achieve reconstruction, 
Myanmar will require resources to meet the material needs of both the local communities and 
the returning refugees. First of all the reconstruction requires a comprehensive need 
assessment and consultations in the areas of return. Therefore both TBC and DCA have 
started on this process with the ‘Go and See’ visits and they are furthermore implementing 
small scale improvements in the rural areas in SE Myanmar. However, it is though important 
to stress that these projects are still on an early pilot stage, and no larger implementation have 
been done so far.  
 
5.2.3.3 Involving local communities 
After identifying the needs, second step is to implement reconstruction projects. TBC 
economically supports the implementations of these initiatives, but it is important that the 
local community identifies their needs and moreover that the implementation is carried out by 
locals (Bjerrum, TBC: 02.22). By involving the local communities and asking them about 
their needs a more sustainable reintegration will be possible. The provision of assistance 
should be conflict-sensitive minimising unintended negative impact while maximising its 
peace building impact. In a sensitive post conflict context as in Myanmar it is important to 
avoid tensions between returnees and local communities. By involving local communities the 
projects can contribute to peace building in areas of return. Therefore UNHCR urges for co-
existence projects and other activities that can support the reintegration (UNHCR 2013: 8). 
According to Bjerrum the overall idea of TBC’s projects is that the local communities 
experience improvements in their living conditions and hereby also benefit from the return of 
the refugees (Bjerrum, TBC: 55.24). This is also supported by Ussing who expands the 
argument by stressing that, 
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It is difficult to create programs for the returning refugees, because what about those 
who stayed behind? Will there be an unequal distribution? You will need to create a 
community approach, which is for everyone and not just the returning refugees 
(Ussing, DCA: 37.40-37.55).  
 
These community driven activities have a two-side effect. On one side they alleviate the 
material insecurities that the refugees express as a hinder for their return to Myanmar by 
reconstructing and rebuilding Myanmar. On the other side it can also be argued that these 
community driven activities can help the reconciliation process. According to Bjerrum there 
can be a potential conflict between the local people in Myanmar and the returning refugees. 
He explains that even though the refugees have lived in some kind of prison, they have still 
received education and healthcare, while the local communities have not received anything 
hence they have lived under the repressive Myanmar Government. Thus the local people, as 
mentioned earlier, fear that the returning refugees might have better possibilities of getting 
the few jobs available. In order to avoid this possible source of conflict and instead promote a 
peaceful reconciliation, TBC works towards not only helping the refugees, but also the entire 
local community (Bjerrum, TBC: 02.22). Høj supports this argument, by stating that, 
The discussion is to create a situation where it is not only the people who are coming 
back who gains from it, but also the people who are already there – that will be the 
best situation. But that is obviously easier said than done. But that should be the 
target (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 28.13-28.32).  
 
According to UNHCR the participation of returnees and receiving communities is crucial to 
achieve sustainable reconstruction. As argued by UNHCR participation will help the 
organisations to assess needs and to ensure that local and national actors have the knowledge 
and skills to maintain reconstruction activities. Sustainability will only be achieved through 
enlisting the support and developing the capacity of local agencies and community 
organisations (UNHCR 1998). This also calls for the local government to take part in the 
projects. However the Myanmar Government is still not involved in the projects, which can 
be a barrier to achieve a sustainable reintegration, which we will return to in the discussion.   
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5.2.4 Summing up 
The programmes analysed are only at a pilot stage. The organisations are looking into 
possibilities of a return by preparing the ground and alleviating some of the insecurities 
currently making the refugees reluctant to return to Myanmar. It is important to stress that 
even though closing down refugee camps, signalises that the refugees no longer have needs 
specifically related to their displacement, they continue to have a need for protection and 
assistance.  
Livelihood opportunities and areas of return are both key concerns for the refugees and areas 
TBC and DCA have started to look into. The organisations want to be as prepared for the 
return as they can. Even though consensus is that the time is not yet right for a voluntary 
repatriation, no one knows what will happen. As explained by Kumar,  
We are looking at when there is an opportunity for the refugees to return, when it is 
safe in terms of landmines and conflict, and the refugees express a willingness to 
return. How can DCA help prepare this return and prepare the villages in Myanmar 
for the returning refugees? (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 03.09-03.50). 
 
The organisations’ projects are preliminary work for a return, which will mainly help 
alleviate social and physiological insecurities as well as material insecurities. However, they 
cannot guarantee the refugees’ right to land or secure their future in terms of jobs or security. 
When it comes to legal and physical insecurity, there is a limit to the possibilities for NGOs.  
The projects initiated by TBC and DCA create the groundwork for a sustainable return 
mainly by focusing on reconstruction projects. Moreover the organisations can contribute to 
the reconciliation process by including local communities in prioritising needs and hereby 
making them experience benefits from the return of refugees and avoid further conflicts.  
In the sensitive post conflict context it is crucial to avoid fostering tensions between returnees 
and local communities. However, this in only on a local level, and the reconciliation process 
needs to include many actors besides the refugees and local communities.  
 
Our theory shows that in order to achieve sustainable reintegration in a post conflict society, 
there has to be initiatives, which focus on both reconstruction and reconciliation. In the next 
section we will therefore analyse aspects of reconciliation in Myanmar, and how the 
organisations are limited in achieving this. 
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5.3 Analysis three 
As analysed in the previous section, TBC and DCA are looking into possibilities of securing 
a sustainable return by alleviating insecurities and thereby working to secure that refugees 
can return voluntarily and with dignity.  
However, in order to understand to what extent the organisations can help prepare a 
sustainable return, it is important to include structures in the post conflict context in 
Myanmar, which can be a hindrance of the organisations’ work. In the following part we will 
therefore look into challenges for a sustainable return, which can be problematic for TBC and 
DCA to solve. A crucial challenge relates to the national reconciliation, and since the 
organisations primarily work on a grass root level, they are limited in their ability to 
influence this process. We will focus on the importance of reconciliation, and why it is 
necessary for a successful reintegration in Myanmar. 
 
5.3.1 Reconciliation 
A sustainable return and reintegration of the refugees call for both reconstruction and 
reconciliation. The reconstruction process has begun, nonetheless, these projects are 
essentially dependent on reconciliation. As stressed by UNHCR, At the very minimum, 
reconciliation involves ensuring the peaceful co-existence of parties to the conflict (UNHCR 
1998). It is therefore vital to create a safe environment for the refugees to return to. There is a 
need to pay attention to relations after a return and to recognize that even if repatriation is the 
end of one cycle, it is also usually the beginning of a new cycle, which can challenge and 
expose some returnees to vulnerability (Black and Koser 1999: 3).  
Myanmar’s internal conflicts in the form of 60 years of bloody battles between the Myanmar 
military and ethnic armed groups, as well as the massive repression of the Myanmar 
population and the internal and external displacement of hundreds of thousands have created 
a deeply flawed and weak relationship between the state and civil society. In a post conflict 
context where a conflict has created a fragmented society, it is crucial to restore structures 
and re-establish trust to resolve the conflict peacefully (Barnes 2005: 84). After the violent 
conflict in Myanmar it is important to work with the structures within the country, abolish 
divisions in society and work to eliminate prevailing insecurity and mistrust between the 
people and the Myanmar Government. Moreover, there is a crucial need to address the root 
causes of the conflict in order to build a long-term peace.  
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In a society emerging from conflict it is vital to foster sustainable institutions and sustainable 
development, transparent and accountable governance, promotion of democracy, respect for 
human rights and the promotion of peace and non-violence (Chimni 2002: 174). However, 
this is a task, which is not possible or expected for the organisations to fulfil.  
 
Moreover the return of refugees is an integral part of the broader reconciliation process in 
Myanmar, as the return is an intrinsically part of a long-term peace process in the country. 
The principle of voluntary repatriation is important, as the refugees express confidence in the 
future of their country by returning and thereby plays an important part in Myanmar’s 
recovery. There is a symbiotic relationship between the return and reintegration of displaced 
people and the peace building process. Unless uprooted populations can go back to their 
homes with a reasonable degree of security in their community, the transition from war to 
peace may in some situations be delayed or even reversed. Hereby voluntary return can 
validate the post conflict political order.  
 
5.3.2 Fear of the Myanmar military 
A central obstacle to sustainable reintegration in a post conflict society is the high level of 
insecurity, especially the breakdown of social relations between parties to the conflict 
(UNHCR 1998). The Myanmar refugees express that they have concerns about their physical 
security, as they still fear the Myanmar military and are lacking trust in the Myanmar 
Government. The physical insecurity is to a large extent a consequence of the continued 
presence of the military in the areas the refugees want to return to. The fear of the military 
springs from decades of violent attacks on civilians and constant violations of human rights, 
and as long as the military is still present in the local townships, the refugees do not dare to 
return. Bjerrum argues that if the military withdrew, there would be a large number of 
returnees to Myanmar. It is not likely though that a withdrawal of the military will happen 
any time soon. The timeframe for a change related to the physical insecurity is very 
uncertain. Even though ceasefires have been signed in the areas of SE Myanmar, no sign of a 
code of conduct or actual discussions on the roots of the conflicts have been seen (Phan 
2014). 
Reconciliation is crucial for the refugees to return, as they want to be guaranteed their 
physical safety. However, this is not something organisations as TBC or DCA can secure, as 
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they are not involved in the armed conflict or wish to get involved in the disagreements 
between the military and the ethnic armed groups.  
The work of NGOs is limited and restricted in Myanmar, and the organisations have to be 
careful not to get too involved in the conflict. Ussing does, however, argue that as long as the 
organisations’ projects are limited to contributing to the reconstruction of the country - 
projects that are normally carried out by the state - the military allows them to continue their 
work (Ussing, DCA: 52.52). 
 
Instead of getting involved in the conflict TBC tries to alleviate the physical insecurity by 
advocating for international observers to be present in the border areas in order to document 
violations of human rights and furthermore how the Myanmar military is responding to the 
return of the refugees (Bjerrum, TBC: 01.01.21). The argument is supported by scholar in 
South Asia conflicts, Krishna Kumar, who argues that for a reconciliation process to succeed 
successfully on a community level in a war torn society it is essential not to violate human 
rights, as the flagrant legitimacy of the official institutions can be further damaged if human 
rights continues to be violated (Kumar 1997: 9) Therefore it would be possible to argue that 
for the physical insecurity to be eliminated or at least minimised, the Myanmar military has 
to withdraw from the areas that the refugees wish to return to, as their presence and attack 
were one of the main reasons for the flight. It is not likely to happen any time soon though, 
since the ceasefires and peace agreements are still very unstable.  
Instead it would strengthen the reconciliation process to allow international observers to be 
present in order to document and secure that no violations on human rights happen and 
thereby create a secure environment for the refugees to return to. Even if the Myanmar 
military would still be visible, the refugees would feel safer if international observers were 
present.  
 
5.3.3 Trust in the future 
In continuation of the fear of the military we have identified how trust is also an important 
factor when it comes to the refugees’ hesitation to return to Myanmar. The return depends on 
the sustainability of the ongoing peace process. After up to 30 years in a refugee camp, the 
refugees’ belief in peace has been severely tested and their trust in the peace agreements is 
very limited. The refugees do not trust the intentions and promises made by the government. 
There are signed ceasefires in the areas of SE Myanmar, but as stressed previously these have 
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not led to any discussions of the root causes of the conflict or how changes are going to 
happen. 
Trust in the Myanmar Government is yet to be built after a long history of human rights 
abuses. Even though ceasefires have been signed, several agreements have been broken 
throughout the last years. Currently there are violent conflicts in the northern part of 
Myanmar, and the further development in this conflict will also play a role in influencing the 
prospects for peace elsewhere. 
As defined by Johan Galtung, Reconciliation is the process of healing the traumas of both 
victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relation. The process 
prepares the parties for relations with justice and peace (Galtung in Abu-Nimer 2001: 3). 
The reconciliation process is crucial for the refugees to believe in the promises of the 
Myanmar Government. It is though stressed by both TBC and DCA that establishing trust 
between the Myanmar Government and the civil society is out of their hands, hence they are 
not in a position where they can build relations, which foster justice and peace within 
Myanmar. Instead they can prepare both refugees and the local communities for the future 
(Høj & Kumar, DCA: 19.58 and Bjerrum, TBC: 51.19). 
 
5.3.4 The right to land 
As stressed in the second part of the analysis the organisations meet a great obstacle when it 
comes to the refugees’ right to own or reclaim land in Myanmar. We have stressed that the 
organisations can help investigate possible areas of return, but when it comes to the legal 
right to possess a piece of land, their options are very limited. What we have identified the 
organisations can do is to start dialogues with the local authorities on possible areas of return. 
However, the Myanmar Government owns all the land and they have to hand over the legal 
ownership to refugees or other citizens. So far, they have not shown much willingness to do 
so or engaged in talks about possible areas of return. Thus organisations are not in a position 
where they can negotiate with the Myanmar Government about giving land to returnees. 
Nevertheless, if they get the acceptance from local authorities, it is sometimes the first step 
towards securing land and alleviating legal insecurities.  
 
The insecurity of access to land is also stressed by Bjerrum. He argues that this uncertain 
situation makes TBC’s work very challenging. Even though they try to find possible 
solutions for a return, it is risky business. The organisation cannot just find an area and 
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promote return. What happens if the refugees move back to this area, and then the military go 
in and clear the area? Who will be responsible? (Bjerrum, TBC: 37.30-37.50). Therefore 
Bjerrum stresses that TBC (and other organisations) is not in a position where they can 
promote a return, since they are not capable of eliminating the legal insecurities, which 
currently hinder a sustainable return. 
Moreover it can be very difficult to discuss concrete aspects of return. Part of the reason for 
this may be the high level of anxiety about potential forced repatriation and the decreased 
funding to the camps, which signalises a possible closing of the camps. A concern is that the 
organisations might be seen as promoting return if they put too much emphasis on 
preparedness. Supporting return could easily be interpreted as promoting a premature return 
when conditions are not yet conducive (The Border Consortium 2015: 18). 
 
5.3.5 Summing up 
What has been outlined in the above draws a picture of a very challenging environment for 
the organisations to work in. It gives us an idea about where the organisations face limitations 
in their work, and why it is difficult for the organisations to help facilitate the reconciliation 
process in a post conflict society as Myanmar where the environment is still too uncertain and 
filled with mistrust and broken promises. 
The aim of working with reconciliation is to secure that the refugees will be protected upon 
their return. Not only is the withdrawal of the Myanmar military necessary but also more 
long-term initiatives to secure both physical security and legal security. This calls for efforts 
to support the Myanmar Government and local authorities in the re-establishment of law and 
order, judicial systems and local governance mechanisms (UNHCR 2014).  
However, organisations as DCA and TBC do not have the capacity or means to secure 
reconciliation, as they mainly contribute to the reconciliation process on a local level. A wide 
range of actors will need to be engaged to ensure reconciliation on a higher level. 
Organisations can begin the process of return and reintegration, but they cannot plan, initiate 
and complete the full range of activities needed to reintegrate returnees. There is a need for 
coordination and collaboration between all stakeholders involved to create and complete a 
reintegration program, which will include both reconstruction and reconciliation.  
I the next chapter we will discuss factors which can either extend or reduce the organisations’ 
possibility to prepare a sustainable return and thereby include a bigger perspective on the 
future for the Myanmar refugees. 
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6.0 Discussion 
From our analysis, we have concluded that TBC and DCA can alleviate insecurities, which 
currently hinder a voluntary return to Myanmar, mainly by initiating reconstruction projects, 
which focus on livelihood opportunities and finding possible areas of return. We have 
furthermore analysed which limitations the organisations meet in their work to prepare a 
sustainable return, as the post conflict setting in Myanmar is a challenging environment to 
work in. It is characterised by mistrust and there is a limit to how much the organisations can 
do, when they try to achieve reconciliation. First of all, it is important to stress that 
reconciliation is an ongoing process - not an end goal - which may last for generations,  
Reconciliation is an extremely complex and multifaceted process that can be strongly 
impacted by political, economic, and cultural variables that are not always easy to 
measure or manage. Forgiveness and healing are very personal processes that may 
require time and nuanced approaches to promote (United states Institute of Peace 
2009: 188). 
Therefore the Myanmar Government and the civil society should be prepared to continue 
promoting reconciliation processes over an extended period of time and on many different 
levels. As argued by Macrae, healing and developing of the country will take time and 
furthermore addressing the needs of post conflict societies is neither easy nor quick (Macrae 
1999 in Crisp 2001: 18). Sustainable reintegration, and the sustainability of reintegration 
programmes, must therefore be regarded as elusive and very long-term objectives (UNHCR 
2001: 18). 
 
In the following we will discuss which factors can support the organisations’ work and create 
better conditions for a sustainable return, and moreover which factors can challenge their 
current and future work in Myanmar. In this regard it important to discuss collaboration with 
local partners, the Myanmar Government’s responsibility, the peace process and the 2015 
election. 
 
6.1 Local partners 
The reintegration programs initiated by DCA and TBC are supposed to lay the groundwork 
for a long-term sustainability by alleviating insecurities. However, the organisations may not 
have the necessary resources or skills to sustain the projects, meaning they might initiate 
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them, but not be able to maintain them for a longer period as many projects are limited to a 
certain time frame (UNHCR 2014). Therefore it is crucial to work with local partners who 
can secure the long-term continuity of the projects. 
In Myanmar there have been very limited possibilities for civil society, nevertheless, many 
local organisations have worked under the radar to improve the conditions for the local 
communities e.g.. by providing day care centers, healthcare, language instruction etc. 
(Steinberg 2010: 126). They operate on various levels, and provide services that the 
Myanmar Government does not want to give, ignores, or is incompetent to provide. As long 
as they are not seen as threatening the power base or engaging in efforts that undercut the 
state, they are allowed to work (ibid). The local organisations have a better knowledge of the 
needs and moreover better possibilities to reach rural areas. Thus they are important partners 
for TBC and DCA, as their network and experience strengthen the outcome of the 
organisations’ initiated projects.    
 
By working with local partners and creating partnerships, it challenges the traditional donor-
beneficiary relationship, and seeks a stronger, mutual relationship beyond limited project 
funding in terms of time and content (DanChurchAid 2009: 18). According to DCA the 
development work carried out by DCA becomes sustainable through the building of strong 
local organisations (DanChurchAid 2009: 20). Even though the projects in Myanmar are on 
an early stage, it is never too early to include local partners in the planning and initiatives. 
One way to work with local partners is to build capacity and give the local organisations in 
Myanmar the skills to maintain the projects and take responsibility for developing their 
community. Involving local partners also includes planning and implementing projects, 
which involve and benefit different parts of the community, and it may also cut across the 
lines of the conflict. Encouraging civil society to participate in shared projects will provide 
communities with common interests and investments, which will help both the reconstruction 
and reconciliation process (UNHCR 2014). This is important, as decades of conflict and 
displacement have weakened traditional community support and leadership structures. Thus 
investment in capacity building is necessary. Collaboration and investment in human 
resources will help the local organisations to more fully participate in their civil society and 
empower them to become independent.   
Another way to strengthen the projects is to work with border-based groups who work out of 
Thailand, who can complement the organisations’ work. The border-based groups have 
worked with the refugee communities for over 30 years, and the networks and working 
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relationships they have developed will be invaluable in building trust and providing services 
(UNHCR 2013, 2). Collaborating with these groups can help the sustainability of the 
projects, as they have an insight and experience with the challenges. Moreover to link local 
Myanmar organisations with border-based groups secures a partnership and the possibility for 
professional discussions and feedback, even if the international organisations leave. 
 
Local partners can help sustain the projects and strengthen the sustainability, but, as 
mentioned earlier, a wide range of actors need to be engaged to secure a sustainable return. It 
can be argued that working with local partners is one way of creating coordination and 
collaboration, which to a certain extent will help the work of the organisations. However, it 
has limitations. Mobilising local organisations on an early stage will be crucial for a 
sustainable reintegration, nevertheless, this type of collaboration will not be enough. In order 
to create a sustainable reintegration, collaboration with a broader range of actors is important. 
 
According to Chimni, an important collaboration has to be established between the 
international organisations that work within the field in order to create dialogue and 
coordination in the pursuit of reintegration (Chimni 2002: 177). The number of international 
and national NGOs as well as the scale of humanitarian and development activities in 
Myanmar is currently expanding. Therefore UNHCR and their partners are reviewing how 
coordination in support of durable solutions can be strengthened and centered on shared 
strategies in a broader protection framework (UNHCR 2013:9).  
Nonetheless, collaboration between the international organisations that works with 
sustainable return to Myanmar is ideally speaking not enough. There is a great need for 
initiatives from the Myanmar Government to create the right conditions for a sustainable 
return. Collaboration and initiatives, or at least acceptance, from the Myanmar Government 
will help the organisations to implement their projects and work together to create the best 
opportunities for a sustainable return. If this is not accomplished, the Myanmar Government 
can be a great hindrance for the future work of the organisations 
 
6.2 Who has the responsibility for refugees? 
In order to discuss the importance of collaboration with the Myanmar Government, it is 
necessary to situate the projects in a broader political-economic context. To secure a 
sustainable return and durable solutions are fundamentally linked to the restoration of 
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national capacity to provide for the protection and welfare of the refugees (UNHCR 2013, 2). 
The projects cannot be seen as a self-containing and alone laying the groundwork for a long-
term development. As argued by UNHCR, In fact, reintegration will only be sustainable if it 
takes into account the national and regional political and economic context, including 
security, macro-economic trends and the political stability of the regime (UNHCR 2014). 
Therefore there is a need for the projects to have a systematic engagement with local 
partners, and moreover engagement from the Myanmar Government and other national 
stakeholders is crucial. The state should be a key partner, not only for the planning of 
reintegration activities but also in sustaining them. In other words, organisations must adhere 
to the principle of unconditional respect for national sovereignty, and assume that the state 
will be the legitimate and competent body for reintegration planning (Macrae 1999: 15). 
However, at the moment the Myanmar Government does not pay much attention to the 
question of refugee return. To a certain extent, they collaborate with the Royal Thai 
Government, as they have meetings about the refugee issues, but for now both parties 
emphasise that time is not right and furthermore the RTG stresses that it will happen 
according to international guidelines. 
 
The organisations works on a grass root level, but this can often be a challenge, as there has 
been very limited space for civil society and NGOs to implement development projects in 
order to secure a safe return for the refugees and to improve the lives of the local Myanmar 
people. It can be argued that this is slowly changing and the Myanmar Government is 
loosening their grip and giving civil society and international organisations more possibilities 
to work within the country. Yet, they are still not showing much willingness to prepare a 
return even though ideally the national authorities should have the primary responsibility to 
secure durable solutions and reintegration for refugees. If the national authorities handle these 
issues, NGOs, UNHCR and other humanitarian or development actors can play a 
complementary role in supporting the sustainable repatriation (UNHCR 2013, 2). However, 
our informants stress that dealing with the refugees is not a concern for the Myanmar 
Government, and therefore the task of securing durable solutions is now up to international 
organisations. As stressed by Bjerrum, You have to remember, that for the Myanmar 
Government, the refugee issue is completely forgettable. There are 70 million living in Burma 
and only 110.000 refugees. It doesn't matter. It is not at all on the political agenda in 
Myanmar (Bjerrum, TBC: 1.01.49-1.02.06)."The Myanmar Government has plenty of other 
concerns when recovering from the conflict. In many post conflict contexts, as the one in 
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Myanmar, the state will be unable or unwilling to extend full national protection to all of its 
citizens following violent conflict. At least for now. 
 
What the organisations fear, is that there will come a push from the RTG or an increased lack 
of funding, which will force the refugees to return before Myanmar is ready to receive them. 
Even though all involved parties stress that time is not right for repatriation, it will inevitably 
happen at some point. Therefore the organisations stress the importance of preparing the 
return as early as possible. As argued by Chimni, the planning for repatriation must begin 
long in advance. Moreover the repatriation and reintegration should not be seen as two 
separate tasks but be addressed in an integrated manner (Chimni 2002: 176). It is not enough 
to plan the actual return process. You also have to consider the conditions necessary to make 
the return sustainable. 
 
Organisations as TBC and DCA cannot force the Myanmar Government to change their 
focus, but they can advocate for the refugees and work to create the most sustainable return 
as possible. Yet, as mentioned earlier, is it a tightrope for the organisations, as they can be 
seen as promoting return, if they put too much emphasis on preparedness? As argued by 
Chimni, organisations should simply facilitate refugee return, rather than organise it. Hereby 
they will respect refugees’ own knowledge, criteria for decision-making and ultimately their 
decisions on whether or not to repatriate (Chimni 1993: 448). As mentioned by both TBC and 
DCA they are only preparing the return, but never going to tell the refugees when to return 
(Høj & Kumar, DCA: 4.21 and Bjerrum, TBC: 22.27). 
It is though important to view the projects in a broader political and economically perspective 
hence there is a strong need for the collaboration and attention from the Myanmar 
Government. Firstly, because ideally they are the main responsible for securing the return of 
the refugees, but secondly, and maybe most importantly, a lack of collaboration with the 
Myanmar Government can be a great hindrance for the organisations’ future work. 
 
6.3 Peace process 
Even though there have been positive developments in the Myanmar peace process 
uncertainty remains around whether the ceasefire agreements will lead to durable peace 
accords. As argued by Zoya Phan, former refugee and one of Myanmar’s leading democracy 
activists in Europe, It isn’t a genuine peace process when the Burmese government signs a 
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ceasefire in one place, and then breaks it in another (Phan 2014). Nevertheless, UNHCR 
stresses that the signing of a national ceasefire agreement along with changes in the overall 
security environment would be of significant importance for the reluctance of the refugees to 
return (UNHCR 2014). 
Høj argues that if the refugees experience a sustainable cooperation in the official system and 
a willingness to separate power after the 2015 election, they will have more faith in the future 
peace process. He does, however, question whether this will happen (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 
55.00). His hesitation to believe in the peace process and the impact of the election can have 
a variety of explanations. One of the reasons is that the details of the national ceasefire 
agreement is still not agreed upon by all parties and there is no reason to believe that a signed 
agreement will happen any time soon - especially after the recent violent outbreaks in the 
northern parts of Myanmar. Another factor, which hinder a signing of the national ceasefire 
agreement, is the role of the Myanmar military. As long as the military is not willing to 
withdraw from some of their powerful positions and change the constitution guaranteeing 
them the majority in the parliament, the ethnic groups refuse to sign the agreement.  
Therefore it can be argued that the peace process is a hindrance for a voluntary return, 
because as long as the refugees do not see any significant change in the peace process, they 
are reluctant to return to Myanmar. This reluctance is mainly a result of the lacking trust in 
the intentions of the military as outlined earlier. 
 
What is important for the peace process is not only to agreeing on a national ceasefire, but 
also the need to address the root causes of the conflict. According to Phan, the political 
situation has to be addressed before the refugees can return safe and with dignity. She 
stresses that a ceasefire alone does not solve the problem, but it is necessary with a political 
solution and furthermore to understand the history of Myanmar and the conflict. Moreover 
she argues, Even if the 2015 elections could bring in a democratic government, which is 
impossible under the 2008 Constitution that won’t tackle the root causes of conflict and 
dictatorship in Burma. The Myanmar Government has so far refused to accept Myanmar as a 
country of many ethnicities and this attitude is, according to Phan, the root cause of why 
Myanmar has not known peace since the independence, The current reform process in 
Myanmar is not genuinely addressing the most fundamental and important challenge, an 
agreement with Burma’s many ethnic people which leads to a federal Burma in which the 
rights and culture of ethnic people are protected (Phan 2014). According to her, there will 
never be a genuine and lasting peace in Myanmar until this issue is properly addressed. 
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Despite the scepticism towards the peace process, UNHCR on the other hand stresses that 
there has been changing dynamics. The new civilian government has started to make efforts 
towards an internal peace process with the ethnic armed groups in the border areas. These 
efforts have led to debates about the opportunities for refugees to return. The changing 
environment makes it prudent that measures are initiated to prepare for a possible repatriation 
of refugees. Yet UNHCR emphasise that any preparation should be initiated with caution, in 
order to avoid sending the wrong message to both the Myanmar Government, ethnic armed 
groups, refugees and local partners (UNHCR 2013, 2). 
 
It can be argued that as long as the peace process, despite the positive change of dynamics, is 
moving forward slowly, there are still too many uncertainties surrounding the future for the 
refugees. Many refugees will hesitate to return, as long as the political structures are this 
unstable, and they do not see any willingness to address the root causes of the conflict. 
Therefore the lack of development in the peace process is an obstacle for the organisations’ 
work in Myanmar, as it hinders an increased trust in the future for the refugees. 
 
6.4 2015 Election 
Another factor, which makes the organisations’ work for a voluntary return more complex, is 
the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the 2015 election (Oh 2014: 6). 
It can be argued that the results of the election can be of great significance for the future 
situation in Myanmar, since the winning party and the elected president can change the 
structures of the political landscape in Myanmar and thereby create either better or worse 
conditions for the return of the refugees. Moreover a fair and free election, which have not 
been seen since the independence in 1948, can signal that actual changes are going to happen, 
and the Myanmar Government’s intentions of reforms and peace agreements are genuine. 
On the other hand it is possible, and maybe more likely, that the election turns out to be 
without importance for the refugees. Primarily because the military has the majority in the 
parliament and whoever gets elected as president will still have to cooperate with the 
military. Thus it can be argued that no real power is handed over, until the military no longer 
is guaranteed 25% of the seats in the parliament. 
 
When we asked our informants about their thoughts of the outcome of the election, neither of 
them considers it as a crucial factor. Bjerrum stresses that what happens in the political 
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landscape is not the refugees’ primary concern. What matters to them is the situation in the 
communities they wish to return to (Bjerrum, TBC: 35.41). Ussing furthermore argues that 
for the refugees and the organisations who work on their behalf, the only important outcome 
of the election is who will be the chief ministers in the areas they want to return to (Bjerrum, 
TBC: 44.15). The election of chief ministers will determine how easy or challenging it will 
be for refugees, local partners and organisations to negotiate the right to settle down on 
certain properties and implement development projects. 
 
Bjerrum argues that the election can change the international society’s perspective on funding 
the refugee camps in Thailand. He stresses that if the election is declared free and fair by the 
international society, donors might question why they should continue their support to the 
camps. If you recognise Burma as a democratic society, you cannot at the same time accept 
refugee camps in Thailand (Bjerrum, TBC: 17.46-17.51). This can force the refugees to 
return before conditions are right, and moreover it can limit the organisations’ possibilities to 
help prepare a sustainable return, as they will lose their funding.  
Bjerrum points to the fact, that a free and fair election can happen even though violent 
outbreak and unstable conditions still occur in several parts of the country (Bjerrum, TBC: 
17.43). Therefore an election should never be the only measurement of deciding the need for 
refugee camps but also include the specific conditions in the areas of return and the possible 
insecurities affecting a return. He fears that it might end in a situation, where the border areas 
are not peaceful, but the international community recognises the election as free and fair and 
will therefore not finance the refugee camps. 
 
Even though both Bjerrum and Ussing argue that the election will not make a decisive 
difference for the refugees in a wider context, Kumar believes that the refugees are waiting to 
see the results of the election (Høj & Kumar, DCA: 13.16). 
It would be possible to argue that the outcome of the election will give some directions about 
the future political environment in Myanmar. If the parties will actually divide power and 
establish a parliament, hopes are that the ceasefires will be more stable and a future peace 
agreement will be more than just a talk about the talk. 
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6.5 Summing up 
The future for the refugees and Myanmar’s development, in overall terms, can have many 
different outcomes, and currently it is difficult to predict what will happen. Nevertheless, we 
have discussed different factors that can become either an advantage or a hindrance for a 
sustainable return. 
Local partners are of great importance for a sustainable reintegration, since involving already 
existing actors in the local societies can make the projects facilitated by the organisations 
sustainable, even when the organisations at some point have to withdraw. We did however 
also find it important to discuss the work of the organisations in a more political-economic 
framework, which led us to the conclusion that involvement of local partners is not sufficient, 
as there has to be certain collaboration with the Myanmar Government. They are the main 
responsible for securing a sustainable return for refugees and without their acceptance of the 
organisations’ work, they can become a fatal hindrance for the organisations. 
Moreover we have discussed which impact the peace process and the 2015 election can have 
on the future work of the organisations, as they can turn out to be either a benefit or an 
obstacle. If they have a positive outcome, it can give the refugees trust in the future and 
alleviate some of their insecurities. On the other hand if neither the peace process nor the 
election succeed, the refugees will continue to show mistrust in the future and a reluctance to 
return to Myanmar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
7.0 Conclusion 
In order to answer our research question, To what extent can The Border Consortium and 
DanChurchAid, in a post conflict context, alleviate insecurities, which may hinder a 
sustainable return of the Myanmar refugees in Thailand? we have made an analysis based on 
three levels followed by a discussion. We have chosen to use frameworks from UNHCR 
complemented with theoretical inputs on sustainable return to a post conflict society. This has 
helped us develop a clear definition of sustainable return and what the process requires. 
Moreover it has provided us with tools to assess the activities the organisations are preparing 
and moreover how they fit into the larger picture of sustainable return to Myanmar. In the 
following section we will outline our conclusions and make some final remarks. 
 
With a point of departure in UNHCR’s framework for sustainable return we have identified 
which insecurities currently hinder the refugees from returning. From this part we conclude 
that especially the ability to sustain a livelihood in Myanmar and the right to settle down on a 
piece of land, without fearing to be forced to flee again, are dominating insecurities which 
hinder the refugees from returning. Furthermore we conclude that a lacking trust in the 
Myanmar Government and a fear of the military is of great concern to the refugees. The 
refugees express that as long as there are no guarantees for security and a decent life in 
Myanmar, they will not voluntarily return. 
 
In the second part we analysed how the organisations DCA and TBC can prepare the most 
sustainable return by alleviating some of the insecurities. We assess that the organisations’ 
ability to alleviate the refugees’ insecurities are primarily limited to securing livelihood and 
to examine possible areas suitable for a return, which are mainly related to reconstruction 
activities. Moreover the organisations can promote reconciliation on a local level, hence the 
projects include and take into account the local needs, and therefore benefits both the 
returnees and the local communities. The projects initiated, even though they are still on a 
pilot stage, are creating the groundwork for a sustainable return, but we assess that they 
cannot be seen as self-containing or alone laying the groundwork for a long-term 
development. 
 
Therefore we looked into the organisations’ limitations when they work towards a sustainable 
return for the Myanmar refugees. We assess that when it comes to the insecurities as fear of 
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the military and trust in the future, TBC and DCA are rather limited in their ability to 
alleviate these insecurities, since they relate to reconciliation on a national level. Furthermore 
we assess that even though the organisations can investigate possible areas for return, they 
have no opportunity to secure the refugees’ legal rights to possess land in Myanmar. 
 
One of the reasons for the organisations’ inability to alleviate insecurities concerning 
reconciliation is that they are positioned within the post conflicts structures in Myanmar. 
Organisations as TBC or DCA cannot address the problems of developing a post conflict 
society and create sustainable return on their own. The environment in Myanmar is uncertain 
and filled with mistrust and broken promises, and therefore reconciliation is crucial to heal 
the post conflict society, which also calls for initiatives by the Myanmar Government.  
The conflict in Myanmar is an internal conflict and there is a great need for reconciliation 
processes, to secure that the refugees will be reintegrated in the society and the return process 
will be sustainable. Reconciliation is, however, an ongoing process, and both the Myanmar 
Government and the civil society should be prepared to continue promoting reconciliation 
processes over an extended period of time and on many different levels. 
 
In the final part of the thesis, we have discussed actors and aspects that can be either an 
advantage or a hindrance for the future work of securing a sustainable return. We identified 
how local partners are of great importance to secure the sustainability of the organisations’ 
projects by building local capacity. The well established networks with local partners are a 
great advantages for TBC and DCA, since the local partners have experience and connections 
in the rural areas which will benefit the outcome of the initiated projects.  
 
Furthermore we concluded how it is crucial to establish collaboration with the Myanmar 
Government, as a sustainable return is fundamentally linked to the restoration of national 
capacity to provide for the protection and welfare of the refugees. However, at this point 
there is not much attention from the Myanmar Government to secure sustainable return, as 
they have plenty of other concerns. What the organisations can do is to advocate for the 
refugees, work to create the groundwork for a sustainable return, and hope the Thai 
authorities keep their promise of following international guidelines for repatriation. 
 
Furthermore we discussed how the outcome of the peace process and the 2015 election can 
turn out to be either beneficial or an obstacle, hence both factors can either give refugees 
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hope for the future or create even more mistrust regarding the intentions of the Myanmar 
Government. We concluded that the elected president can change the structures of the 
political landscape in Myanmar and thereby create either better or worse conditions for the 
return of the refugees. Nevertheless, until the Myanmar military hands over its power, the 
possibilities for the elected president are limited.  
Moreover we conclude that as the long as the root causes of the conflict are not properly 
addressed, no significant change will happen, which make the refugees reluctant to return. 
Unfortunately, focus lies on the national ceasefire, and there are currently no signs of any 
discussions on how to address the fundamental challenge of meeting Myanmar’s many ethnic 
peoples wishes for a federal Myanmar.  
 
With the above mentioned in mind we assess that DCA and TBC through their projects can 
contribute to an alleviation of the refugees’ insecurities related to reconstruction, but they are 
rather limited when it comes to facilitating reconciliation on a national level. To secure a 
sustainable return to a post conflict society is not only accomplished by the re-establishment 
of livelihoods and securing material needs, but it is also crucial to re-establish social relations 
between parties to the conflict. TBC and DCA can begin the process of preparing a 
sustainable return, but there is a need for coordination and collaboration between all 
stakeholders involved, especially the Myanmar Government, to create and complete a full 
reintegration programme, which will include both reconstruction and reconciliation.  
Even though the process of a sustainable reintegration will take time, the organisations’ 
projects will still make a difference. Even though TBC and DCA are rather small 
organisations, they have experience with the Myanmar context and the refugee camps, they 
are well established and have local collaborators, and therefore the organisations’ impact 
should not be underestimated. They can alleviate some insecurities of returning, change the 
conditions on a local level and moreover advocate for the rights of the refugees when the 
Myanmar Government does not attach any significance to their situation.  
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8.0 Further perspectives 
In this thesis we have examined return of refugees to a post conflict society. In particularly 
we have analysed two organisations’ possibilities of alleviating insecurities, which currently 
hinder a sustainable return of the Myanmar refugees in Thailand. Even though we have made 
a context specific case study, and our aim has never been to make generalisations on the 
return of refugees, our findings can however shed light on challenges of return to post 
conflict societies and the requirements for a sustainable return. 
 
UNHCR estimates that in 2015 the number of people who have been forced to flee their 
country, due to violent conflicts, have reached over 60 million people. This is the highest 
number since World War II. The number includes people seeking political asylum, internally 
displaced, and refugees (Damkjær 2015).  
In addition, it is estimated that more than 11 million refugees live in protracted refugee 
situations, as the Myanmar refugees in Thailand (U.S Department of State). Protracted 
refugee situations exist in most regions of the world, yet the vast majority of these exiles are 
to be found in the world’s poorest and most unstable regions. According to UNHCR the 
biggest single group is Palestinian refugees, adding up to slightly more than five million 
people (Bonfanti 2014). To mention other examples there is the Bhutanese in Nepal, refugees 
from Croatia and Bosnia in Serbia, Liberians in West Africa, and Somalis in Kenya.   
 
Not only is the number of refugees growing, but moreover many refugees are facing a return 
to post conflict societies, where there is a great need for both reconstruction and 
reconciliation. For example to Afghanistan, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo just to mention a few. These post conflict countries will most likely share similarities 
with the challenges in the post conflict context in Myanmar. A return to a country, in fragile 
peace and stability, raises some critical questions of what refugees can expect from their 
return and how to reintegrate them in the society. What are the conditions of the return 
process and who is responsible for ensuring a sustainable return and reintegration?  
 
We have found that the key challenges for a sustainable return to Myanmar include security 
issues, which mean creating an environment that is safe for the refugees to return to, to 
ensure possible areas for return and to find solutions for property disputes, and to include the 
local population in the country of origin, to avoid further conflicts. These findings and the 
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knowledge of challenges can be applicable in other return processes, as the requirements for 
sustainable return are not essentially context specific but share similarities.   
 
For example will the conceivable return of the Palestinian refugees also require a severe 
focus on security and solving the disputes over property, as many Palestinian refugees have a 
great desire to return to their specific area of origin, which today belong to the state of Israel 
(Ibish et al. 2001). Another example is the Croatians and Bosnians, who remain displaced in 
Serbia, as inadequate housing, lack of documentation, as well as unresolved claims to 
property, challenge their ability to repatriate (U.S Department of State). 
In The Democratic Republic of Congo where refugees are now returning from being 
displaced in neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, there is a 
great need to promote peaceful coexistence by conducting reconciliation activities in local 
communities, while also addressing basic education, health and shelter needs (UNHCR 3). 
  
Moreover we have found how local authorities and organisations can play a significant role 
in the success of reintegration programmes, as the community-based approach does not only 
direct aid to returnees but also benefits the local communities and encourage their interest 
and participation in reintegration. These findings can be used in other contexts, where a 
displaced population have to return to their country of origin and to stress the need for greater 
use of local structures to develop and deliver assistance in the reintegration process. For 
example in South Sudan, it is important to strengthen the capacity of local communities to 
respond to the ongoing arrival of returnees by creating more economic opportunities that will 
allow returnees and residents to work together on common projects with shared goals and 
benefits. Moreover it is also important to build the capacity of the state in South Sudan to 
play an important role in the reintegration process (International Organisation for Migration 
2012: 12) 
 
These are few examples, but show how our results can be used in other contexts of return to 
post conflict societies, as some of the basic principles of sustainable return are not context 
specific. Furthermore post conflict societies share similar challenges of reconstruction and 
reconciliation. This thesis contributes only a piece to a much larger debate about sustainable 
return and organisations possibilities of contributing to the process 
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8.1 Further research 
For further research on sustainable return of refugees it would be interesting to examine the 
similarities and differences in cases of repatriation of refugees, with a focus on how the 
country of origin is receiving the returnees. We have found that the state in the country of 
origin should be a key partner, not only for the planning of reintegration activities, but also in 
sustaining them as the state is the main responsible for the rights and well being of its 
citizens. Knowledge of this aspect can be gained from studies of more or less successful 
cases both historical and contemporary. 
For example in the case of return to Bosnia, where the civil war included a widespread ethnic 
cleansing, many returnees did not end up in their original villages, but in other parts of the 
country, where they ended as more or less internally displaced people (Dumper 2006: 33). 
This raises questions of how the state receives ethnic minorities, and how to avoid further 
conflict and displacement upon return to the country of origin. The efforts to provide 
restitution to Bosnian returnees illustrate the difficulty of property issues, and have generated 
key lessons for future restitution and return processes (Leckie 2003: 24).  
Another example is the return to Afghanistan, where hopes were that the return process 
would help to consolidate peace and stimulate development in the country. Yet in practice 
many returnees have struggled to establish decent livelihoods. Conflicts have escalated over 
access to land and other scarce resources, and the return has failed to be an element of peace 
building as it was intended (Bradley 2013). The fragile state structure have not succeeded in 
securing the establishment of livelihood for returnees, and the state have therefore not 
fulfilled its national responsibility to uphold the rights of the returning refugees.  
 
Differences in the outcomes raise the need for an in depth examination of the conditions for 
return and how the process is handled by the country of origin in order to shed light on 
possible future scenarios for the world’s many refugees. The reintegration of refugees is a 
critical post conflict challenge, and questions what sustainable return requires. Which role 
can the country of origin play, how do they best receive the returnees, and how do they meet 
the many obstacles in making repatriation safe and reintegration sustainable?  
Repatriation is far from being a simple solution as return is often a complex process and the 
outcome is far from given. 
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10.0 Appendix 
10.1 Map over Myanmar 
 
 
Source: http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/ethnic-groups.html 
 
 
 
83 
10.2 Map over the refugee camps in Thailand 
 
Source: http://demoplanet.free.fr/karen_refugee_camps.htm 
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10.3 Notes from interview with Myo T. February 19th 2015  
 
There are really bad conditions in the camps. Rumours and no one really knows what is going 
on. Different information from different people and different organisations.  
If you compare to other countries, Burma is in really bad conditions. There are some changes. 
For example in the villages, they have now new roads, so they have more transportation and 
can easy go to the cities. But the roads go through the farming areas and paddies, so the 
people are losing land. They have no choice where the roads are being build. Companies are 
buying land, but the problem is, who owns the land? No one has papers on the land. They 
bought the land maybe 20 years ago, but they just pay and don’t have papers on it. So now 
they cannot claim it.  
For the refugees land is the biggest problem. The land they flee from, has now been taking by 
others. They cannot go back and claim their own land. The military has taken over their land. 
Sold some land to companies. Also sold mountains, where there might be gold, and the 
Burmese people cannot do anything about it. Where should they go? UNHCR is working on 
clearance of land.   
Most people don’t want to go back to Myanmar. They want to resettle in a third country. And 
other people want Thai citizenship. 
We all want to stay in our country if possible, but now it is not possible. We love our country. 
Now it is a transition process, but Government and groups are still fighting. Refugees are 
worried because they have no foundation if they return, no proper job or place to stay, 
education or health care. UNCHR has nothing to say, it depends on the governments 
(Burmese and Thai).  If they have these things in Burma, nobody would be in refugee camps. 
There has been funding cuts in the camps, and the refugee feel very powerless. Now the main 
priority is inside Burma. There are so many people inside Burma, you don’t have to call the 
refugees back. Other thing to consider first.  
The Burmese people and refugees are very patient and do not talk bad about the Government, 
life or other things. They accept their life as it is, and they don’t complain. If something in 
their life is bad, it is due to karma – they might have done something in a previous life. And 
the government knows this.  
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Other countries cannot help Burma. Because it is civil war – a war inside a country. It is up to 
the Burmese people to solve the problem. If it is war between Thailand and Burma, then 
other countries can interfere. 
The camps will be there until the Thai Government closes them.  
Situation in the camps are the same. No one is leaving. But instead more people are coming. 
Fake refugees who only come to the camps because of the resettlement programmes. What he 
experience is that life continues as always. There is not much difference; people live their life 
as they have always done. They are not talking about returning, because life there is okay. 
They have houses, get food and their children can attend school. They don’t know what to 
return to in Burma. People don’t want to go back to Myanmar. They feel like disabled people. 
Even though they have arms and legs, they feel like disabled people. What to do there? Life 
is still better in the camp, even though education is bad, it is still better than Myanmar where 
it is very expensive.  
If they can, they will go back to the areas they came from, because they have family and 
occupation there. If they go to new areas, they don’t know the place and they don’t know 
how to survive there.  
Everybody knows that the government is doing bad things, but the Burmese people will 
forgive them.  
All countries have military. But Myanmar military don’t do military things. Myanmar 
military is bad. They control all things, and is a part of all decisions. The military is linked to 
everything and all chairpersons is from the military. You cannot take a decision without the 
military involved. If the military continues to have the power, the results of the election will 
not mean anything. Who will become president will not change the situation.  
Other counties are looking at Burma, but they only see the good things being done. They only 
see the little white spot and not the whole white paper. They are doing a lot of bad things too. 
But people see the changes, and now they wait for the election 2015 to see the future 
direction.  
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